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AN ABSTRI-\.CT OF '1'HE THESIS OF' Bassey John Ituen fer the 
N;lster of P.rts in History presented September 30, .1970. 
Titlez 	 The E.'uropean Powers j.n Africa I Can the Obstacles 
to Na·tional Unity be attributed to them? Nigeria J 
a 'l'es-t Case. 
APPROVED BY t-1EMBERG OF THE: THESIS COHNITTEE:, 
During the latter part of the nineteent.h century I Euro-. 
'Oe:;ln po't'lers acquired large t:errit.orial areas in .l\.f rica. 'l'hese 
territories ignored the boundaries of old l..frican tri'bal king­
doms and the African modes of life, bf;cause t.;.he new cou.ntries 
were to serve as • COmll\On market t areas suppl!l"ing Europe wi t.h 
the wealth of the tropics. Nigeria it. an eX.::lmple of the new 
supcrst.:ruct.ur0. ,,;hich in op?rat.ion fulls tc; become a h~.)mogeneou5 
ent~_ty after the assumpt.io::: of political Po",,'cr by tht'~ Africans. 
'l."here c,,:rA problmns of exi.st in,; trj.bal kin;dom~, of c;eogrctphic 
2 
distribution of ethnic groups and of traditional values. The 
British colonization of Nigeria also brought about regional 
distribution of Western ideas and differing attitudes among 
Nigerians. The problems, politically, sociologically and 
economically, are imbedded in present day Nigerian society. 
The British attempt to build Nigeria as an economic area has 
produced certain centripetal forces which are revealed in the 
growth of urbanization with resulting detribalization, means 
of communication with the concomitant social mobility, and 
the educational facilities with its new breed of Nigerians. 
The building of national consciousness and political stability 
are faced with centrifugal forces which are really problems of 
change introduced by the Europeans and accepted by the Africans. 
At the same time, the forces of change are challenged by tra­
ditional factors which still weigh on the Nigerian mind. 
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CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

The purpose of the study is to analyse the problems 
of national unity in one of the African countries and see 
whether such problems must be attributed to the European 
Powers which partitioned Africa. The st.udy is not a vindi­
cation of colonial rule, but presents a critical viewpoint 
as far as those problems are concerned • 
. Nigeria will serve as the country under study. It is 
selected because it contains the largest concentratiOn of 
black Africans who might be assumed to be homogeneous. More­
over, immediately after independEmce Nigeria was labelled by 
the Western nations as a bastion of democracy. Its mere size 
creates problems as far as national unity is concerned. In 
addition to this, the civil war in Nigeria and the reaction of 
the African heads of state and other world leaders afford a 
very suitable occasion to examine the problems of national 
unity. • I 
Mention mus~.also be made of ariother factor which in­
duced me to pick Nigeria. As a Nigerian I have seen a little 
bi t of lhe tt170 worlds--the colonial era and the independence 
period of the country. 1'.5 a resident of a coalesced community-­
three villages of about twenty thousand or more people who claim 
2 

a common descent and mores, and live under one group head as 
their secular leader--I could observe some of the problems at 
the local level. ~\nd as an elected representative of this 
cOIDnlunity in a county council which was formed by joining two 
county councils, or rather two clans--Ibesikpo and Asutan--I 
wi trlessea some of the problems of unity at the grass roots. 
Political though such experience may be, it provided strong 
evidence for the 'play it cool' attitude of the traditional 
members in matters of unity~ It also afforded evidence 
against the former civilian regional government in non-govern­
ment party areas, their allocation of amenities, and their 
role on minority issues. 
Materials for this study are based on documentary 
evidence which include journals, case studies of Nigeria in 
general, and my personal experience as a Nigerian. Although 
red tape has forestalled the gathering of opinions from some 
Africans, especially the Nigerian leaders, a number of Nigerians 
and other African students have freely expressed their opinions 
about European powers and national unity in Afri.ca. All the 
I 
sam~~, various Africans in public life have wri tt:en books re­
1 
Obafemi Awolo'vo, Path to Nigerian Freedom. London, 
Faber, 1947. 
Nnamdi. Azik:i.tlle I Poli ticaJ. Blue_print of ~iSI.E...f.ia. Lagos I 
1943. 
T. Ola',lale Elias, Q. C., Government and Politics in Ni­
seria. Net-l York, 1963. 
K'-lame Nkrumah, P.frica Uust unite. F .A. PrCleger I New 
York, 1963. ­
Tom Hboya, F;-eedom and Af1:;er. I,i ttle Brown and Co., 
Boston, 1963. 
3 
lated to this subject, and their O\ffl opinions pertinent to 
this paper were consulted. But the opinions of these African 
writers do not affect my own conclusions since I am trying to 
present a critical point of view of the national problems. 
The attempt of \V'ri ting either African history or presenting 
African problems with sympathy is much reduced. 
In addition to the basic source materials there were 
other isolated parts gathered from some newspapers and maga­
zines. An extensive bibliography has been added at the close 
of the thesis. African oral history, although it could not 
be documented, has helped in forming some opinions; and I 
would like to credit my late uncle, Chief Abakada (Bassey) 
Ituen, a traditional ruler, a sptritual leader and great oral 
historian of the Ibesikpo clan who was consulted by the British 
administrators during the era of clan and division formation. 
j 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Africa is labelled as the Da.l.-k Continent. The phrase 
itself suggests that Africa was a backwater a.rea of Western 
European penetration. Interestingly enough, the Romans had 
colonized a greater part of North Africa though not beyond 
the Sahara. The Arabs through Islam and the caravan trade 
had penetrated much of Africa. Not even the Sahara was a 
barrier for Morocco and Tripoli, the caravan trading centers 
on North Africa, were connected with the trading centers of 
the Western Sudan such as Timbuktu and Kano in what are now 
Mali and Nigeria respectively. The Red Sea trade, on the othe= 
hand, brought Arabic-speaking peoples into East and Central 
Africa. If the Ottoman Empire is regarded as a part of the 
Eastern European affairs, this empire had dependencies in Egypt, 
Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. South Africa also experienced the 
East. African influence of the 1>.rab tradersi such influence I.<las 
very minimal. The sea voyage of Vasco da Gama, a Portuguese, 
with his successful rounding of the Cape of Good Hope in 1498 
opened South Africa to European eyesi however, it was 1652 be­
fore a group of Dutch settlers planted a colony at Cape Town. 
In spite of such western European settlement, lnllch of Africa 
was a trading domain for the Moslem Arab traders. But at the 
5 
same time, some western European nations were coming in contact 
with some of the coastal city-states of certain areas of Africa. 
The Portuguese were the first western European nation to 
reach the Guinea coast of the Western Sudan, and to land their 
1 
first crews in Benin in 1472. Benin was not only a prosperous 
commercial center, but also a powerful kingdom in the forest 
land of the Guinea Coast. The Portuguese through Alfonso 
d'Aveiro opened the first diplomatic relations with the ruler 
of Benin in 1485. Thus the Port.uguese contact expanded the 
trade of Benin. The Benin trade on the forest products such 
as peppers and ivory soon was opened to another western Europecnn 
nation. In 1553 a British sea captain, Winham, 'made the first 
English voyage to Guinea and Benin. The English expedition 
into Benin did not only expand the Benin trade but it also up­
set the tone of the Portuguese trade; for the English traders 
became interested in the local slave trade, and thus gave it 
a new impetus. Between 1600 and 1800 western European nations 
became interested in geographical exploration of Africa. In 
1796 Mungo Park and other Englishmen arrived at the Guinea 
Coast to trace the source and the course of the river Niger. 
In 1823 Clapperton and his crew arrived at Kuka in Bornu, Kano 
in Hausaland, and Sakoto in the Fulani empire. Richard Lander 
1 
Benin is now the capitol of the Midwest State in Nigeria. 
The state is mainly inhabited by the Edos, the Urabos, the 
western Ibos, and the western Ijaws. 
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wit:';. his team reached Brass 3.t the mouth of the ihg0r in 1830. 
D2.',id Livi7lgs tone led an expedition in 185 3 ~long tbe Za.r[;bc.zi 
river; while Sir Richard Burton in 1850 explored lake Tan·· 
ganyika on the East Coast of Africa. Bety.reen 1858 and 1862 
Captain Speke explored the lacustrine region of Uganda. In 
1877 R.M. Stanley, lilho was lat~r employed :in the services of 
King Leopuld II of Belgium, surveyed milch of the Congo basin; 
but the exploration of the Congo region soon attracted Sa·­
vorgnan de Brazza of FranC8. By means of trade and geo­
graphical exploration Western European nations penetrated into 
Africa, and later laid claims to certain African territories. 
Even though the Portuguese were the first European nation 
to arrive in ·the Benin Kingdom, the area of what is now terr::l.ed 
Nigeria was largely influenced by the British. In 1833, the 
slave trade was abolished and the British turned their attention 
to promoting legitimate trade along the Guinea Coast. In 1849 
the British established their first consulate at Calabar. To 
suppress the slave trade, the British consulate found it 
necessary in 1861 to attach and colonize Lagos, then a major 
slave-dealing center. British influence was thus established 
at Lagos colony and the adjacent areas. The establishment of 
the colony of rJagos was the first direct involvement by the 
British government, and the citizens of Lagos were regarded as 
British subjects. Calabar, the consulate headquarters, served 
as a stepping stone to the creat.ion of the Oil Rivers Protect­
7 
orate or the Niger Coast Protectorate which was proclaimed on 
June 5, 1885. The Niger Coast Protectorate was only a trading 
area open to many European firms; but this area was directly 
influenced by the Consulate. The inhabitants of this Oil 
Rivers Protectorate, quite unlike those of Lagos, were re­
garded as British protected persons. 
The amalgamation of the various trading firms on the 
Niger by Sir Taubman Goldie, and the granting of a charter to 
the company so formed allowed the Royal Niger Company to rule 
from 1886 until December 1899 in territories with which the 
2 
agents of the company had signed treaties. The company's 
territory expanded along an ever-moving frontier as its agents 
moved inland. In theory it extended as far as Katsina and 
Bornu in Northern Nigeria; and in the southwest it covered 
3 
New Calabar, Brass and parts of the present Midwest State; 
and to the southeast it extended to Old Calabar, the consulate 
headquarters. Treaties were signed to claim areas of influ­
ence on the parts of the chiefs, but the territorial area of 
the chief was limited according to his ability. If he was a 
wealthy and powerful chief it may take in pockets and hamlets 
2 
The treaties as understood by the chiefs and the people 
of the area were not a political hand-over of their territories 
but they were to allow a peaceful penetration of the company's 
merchants. 
3 
This is Bonny area along the Bight of Biafra. 
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4 
of his in-laws. The company's territorial area was a trade 
area, nay, a service area. To stabilize its spheres of influ­
ence the Royal Niger Company set up a military headquarters at 
Lokoja, a town at the confluence of the Niger and the Benue. 
The stationing of troops in Northern Nigeria helped in the 
pacification of the Fulani emirates. The company also estab­
1ished another headquarters at Asaba on the Niger delta to 
undertake both ruling and trading responsibilities. Bebleen 
1897 and 1898 the Royal Niger Company broke its clauses of 
the charter by monopolizing t.he trade I and had to fight the 
angry Asaba b:aders who burnt t.heir heo.dql1arters. The charter 
was therefore revoked very reluctantly by Her Majesty's 
Government, for many British taxpayers cUd not \vant to assume 
the increased financial burden of administering the colonies. 
Furthermore, many of them believed that the desire far colonies 
had been the cause of most of the wars during- the earlier 
hundred and sixty years. It was in 1900 when the British 
Government took over the control of the Colony of Lagos, the 
Niger Coast Protectorate and the Royal Niger Company's terri­
tory, and christened the new protectorate, Nigeria, a name 
5 
which first appeared in The Times, the British government as 
such now became directly involved \\Tith the administration of 
Nigeria. The new country was divided into three administrative 
4 
A chief may marry more than one \1ife, and aU. the wives 
do not come from one village. 
5 
Federal Hinistry of Information, Nigeria 196~A ~p~.cia~ 
Independence Issue of Nigeria Magazine, October 1960, U'ederal 
Government Printer, Lagos, Nigeria, 1960) p.9. 
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units: the Colony of Lagos, the Protectorate of Southern Ni­
geria, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. The new 
administrative divisions involved major adjustments in the 
former territories of the Oil Rivers Protectorate and the 
Royal Niger Company. It must be emphasized that the ground­
work for the acquisition of territories had been laid by the 
British firms which by various means bought off other non-
British firms. The British government was only taking up 
trade areas of their firms; and although there was fighting 
in Northern Nigeria from 1900 to 1906, it was the result of 
the pacification program, and the establishment of the British 
government's influence. 
By 1906 the Colony of Lagos which was separately ad­
ministered was unified with the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria. Even though the Colony of Lagos was brought under 
the administration of the Southern Protectorate for a period 
of forty-five years (186l-1906), the separate identity of 
Lagos had been a reality, particularly in outlook and insti­
tutions. In 1914, the Colony and the Southern Protectorate, 
and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria were amalgamated 
under one governor-general, but were not uniformly administered. 
The amalgamation caused many administrative problems, some no 
doubt can be attributable to how Great Britain and other Euro­
pean nations reacted to the assassination of Francis Ferdinand 
rather than to the uncongenial climate of Nigeria. There was 
a general lack of British staff to run the 
/ 
country; and the 
territory was very large. In addition there was the problem 
10 

of getting enough money for the administration. Thus a unified 
Nigeria \-las born in the year when British finance and manpmver 
were strained by the First ~vor1d War. 
Lord Lugard, who had served the Royal Niger Company as an 
6 
agent, became the first British Governor-general in the amal­
gamated protectorates. Lord Lugard, therefore, resorted to a 
7 
system of Indirect Rule which entrenched and stabilized auto­
cratic and conservative emirs who supported British interest. 
It is true that Indirect Rule recognized the importance of 
indigenous administration and furthermore reduced the high 
cost of bureaucracy, but Lord Lugard was disdainful of the few 
educated Nigerians since he felt they had nothing in common 
with the masses. Most of the Nigerian. elite were not members 
of the royal families to be appointed as chiefs and emirsi and 
as such they were denied an opportunity of laying the ad~inis-
trative foundation of a unified Nigeria. The Nigerian 
bourgeoisie saw indirect rule as presenting a division between 
the new breed and t.he traditional rulers. Indirect rule per­
petuated the traditional political units of varying sizes in 
. which clannish attitudes and loyalt.ies had their roots. Aside 
6 
In 1894 Lugard rushed to Borgu and made a treaty with 

the chiefs to prevent the French from acquiring all of Kiama 

and Nikki territory into Dahomey. 

7 
T. Olawake Elias, Q.C., Government and Politics in Africa, 
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 24. See a~so Lora-­
Arthur Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Afric~, (London,1922). 
----------- ---- --- -
11 
from Northern Nigeria, Yorubaland and. Bini alTa, there were no 
large scale political organizations, consequently most Nigerians, 
8 
especially those from the South, lacked adndnistrative experi­
ence for running a large political unit. The we.aknesses of 
Lord Lugard's system notwithstanding, indirect rule aimed at 
sta.bility of the Nigerian society and securing law and order 
which would foster British economic interests. Apart from a 
few incidents--the Aba riot of 1929 in which women opposed 
general taxes; the shooting of Enugu coal mine strikers de­
manding fair wages in 1949, and the Kano riot of 1953 in which 
the Northerners fought the Southerners--indirect rule ushered 
in the Pax Britannica. The system became a model for British 
colonial government in East Africa. 
The disdainful attitude of Lord Lugard to the Nigerian 
9 
intelligentsia became the hallmark of Colonial administration. 
IFrom 1923 to 1945 the Nigerian Legislative Council excluded 
many educated Nigerians from the administrative and policy­
making arms of the government. Only four Africans represented 
the Southern Protectorate while the North had no African 
representation. Three members represented the township of Lagos, 
8 
Indirect rule was first introduced into Northern Nigeria 
where the emirs ruled large emirates before the advent of the 
British. In the South the areas ruled by the chiefs were small 
and at times not larger than the village. I. 
9 
Report on the Administration of Southern an . Northern 
Nigeria, and l~dministration, 1912-1919. Cmd. 4681Longon: . 
H.M.S.O., 1920) p. 19. . 
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while one African represented 'Calabar township. Most of these 
appointed members were not native Nigerians: Chief O'Dwyer, 
who represented Calabar, was from Ghana; Sir Adeyemo Alakija 
came from Brazil and Justice S.B. Rhodes was a Sierra Leonian. 
Although Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated, the 
Legislative Council failed to have African representation for 
the North and left Northern legislation in the hands of the 
British Commissioner. 
The French, on the other hand, with their policy of 
cultural assimilation and direct colonial administration, 
absorbed most of the educated Africans. Leopold Senghor and 
Houphouet Boigny became members in the Chamber of Deputies. 
The French regarded the Africans as citizens of France and 
made the colonies as French provinces. Thus, the French 
transferred the African problems to metropolitan France, but 
the granting of independence to the former French colonies and 
the problems came back to those African territories. The civil 
war to suppress secession in Chad, the series of coup d'etats 
in Togo and Dahomey for example, failed to credit French 
acculturization. 
In 1945 Sir Arthur Richards' Constitution balkanized the 
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria into three regions: North, 
East and West. It set up Houses of Assembly with advisory 
powers in each of these regions. The Constitution also estab­
lished a Legislative Council for all the regions. This was 
13 
really the first time that the two Southern regions were brought 
together with the North. The Richards Constitution was seri­
ously criticized by the Nigerian intelligentsia who maintained 
that their own opinion was overridden by the British Consti­
tution makers. In 1950 at Ibadan a Constitutional Conference 
of representatives from all sections of Nigeria was held to 
review the Richards Constitution. The resulting 1951 Revised 
Constitution created a central council of ministers and a House 
of Representatives for the whole country. It also provided for 
Regional Houses of Assembly and Houses of Chiefs in Northern 
and Western Nigeria. But the Revised Constitution was short 
lived. In 1953 in the House of Representatives at Lagos Chief 
Anthony Enahoro presented a motion that, the House accept the 
attainment of self-government for Nigeria in 1956. Alhaji 
Ahmadu, Sardauna of Sokoto and leader of the Northern Peoples' 
Congress, moved the adoption of an amendment to change the 
fixed date to as soon as practicable I • Bitter debate on t.heI 
amendment resulted. Members of the National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens and the Action Group Party walked out of the House. 
The members of the Northern Peoples' Congress were criticized 
and ridiculed as imperialistic stooges. On their return to 
the North they determined never again to be subjected to the 
Southern indignities; and they issued a statement of secession 
of the region from Nigeria. At the height of this tension, 
Chief S .L. Akintola of the P~ction Group scheduled a tour of the 
14 
North to campaign for self-government in 1956. This led to four 
days of rioting in Kano in which about twenty-one Southerners 
and fifteen Northerners "Vlere killed. To forestall the Northern 
secession and to ease the North-South tension, a new consti­
tutional conference held in London in 1953 decided that further 
discussions in Nigeria were necessary. In 1954 the meetings 
of the Constitutional Cor:ference resumeu at Lagos. The result-· 
ing constitutional document provided for direct elections to 
the House of Representatives. The regional legislatures were 
given increased autonomy and responsibility for specific 
matters. The granting of autonomy to the regions was a major 
turning point. It recognized that Nigeria could not be ruled 
under a single, centralized form of government, and that the 
amalgamation of 1914 as symbolized in the appointment of a 
single governor-general had been carried out for financial and 
economic reasons. In 1954 the only symbols of unity were the 
House of Representatives and the governor-general. The 
10 
Macpherson Constitution of 1954 decentralized political power 
. in the country and accepted the fact that real diversities 
existed in Nigeria. The politicians in the country accepted 
the Constitution and they acknowledged the differences in Ni­
geria. 
10 
John Stuart Macpherson was the governor-general of 

Nigeria (April 14, 1948-mid-1955) under whose chairmanship 

the constitution was written. 
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The autonomous powers of the regional legislat.ures went 
into effect in 1957 when Eastern and Western Nigeria attained 
internal self-government. For two years the giant Northern 
Nigeria refused to follow this course because its leaders com­
plained that there vlere inadequately trained men in its key 
administrative posts. In the northern and southern Cameroons, 
the former German colony given to Great Britain as a mandate 
and administered as part of Nigeria, there was some apprehen­
sion. The north, which was administered as a part of Northern 
Nigeria, decided to remain within Northern Nigeria, while the 
southern Cameroons, which was part ,of the Eastern region, 
accepted a quasi-territorial status and made plans for its 
independence outside the framework of Nigeria. In spite of its 
association with Nigeria from 1916 to 1958, the Southern 
Cameroons preferred to unite in 1961 with the former French 
mandated Cameroons, which gained independence in 1960. On 
October 1, 1960 the self-governing regions of the North, East., 
and West formed a federation. They adopted a national anthem 
symbolizing their common brotherhood. The Federation of Ni­
geria undertook a population census on May 13, 1962. The East 
had an average increase of 71 percent, although five of its 
census divisions had increases changing from 120 percent to 
200 percent. The West showed a rise of over 70 percent, while 
the North had an increase of 30 percent. The Chief Census 
Officer, Mr. Warren, dismissed these figures as too exaggerated. 
16 
Before the census, there had been an active political campaign 
to register a substantial population since the number of repre­
sentatives from each region to the Federal House of Represent­
atives was to be based on the census. Surprisingly enough, 
during the population count the Eastern Regional Government 
announced the discovery of villages in Eket and Ibeno areas 
whose population had never been counted during the census of 
1952. Other regions had justifiable misgivings that the census 
figures had been inflated. On November 5, 1963 another census 
was taken under tense conditions and regional mistrust. While 
the census controversy was prevailing, an election to the Fed­
era1 House of Representatives was held on December 30, 1964. 
11 
The united Progressive Grand Alliance with its core areas in 
the Eastern Region and Midwest boycotted this election on the 
grounds that many candidates were returned unopposed in the 
North. The resultant controversy precipitated a crisis in 
which the president of the country hesitated before announcing 
the appointment of the prime minister. The leader of the United 
11 
To prepare for t~e 1964 election the political parties 
in Nigeria reorganized by forming alliances. The United Pro­
gressive Grand Alliance comprises the National Council of 
Nigeria Citizens, which was the governing party in the East 
and the Midwest; the Northern Elements Progressive Union, which 
was the opposition party in the' North; the United Middle Belt. 
Congress was also an opposition party in the Northi and the 
Action Group, a governing party in the West until 1962 and an 
opposition party in the Federal House till 1965 • 
./ 
17 
Progressive Grand Alliance, Dr. Nichael Okpara, felt that the 
Northern Peoples' Congress--the ruling party in the North and 
in the Federation--had undermined the unity of the country in 
many ways. 
Between 1962 and 1965 events in Western Nigeria under­
mined the common brotherhood of the Federation. Western Ni­
geria faced an intrat.cibal struggle of leadership and party 
12 
conflict. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, founder and party leader of 
13 
the Action Group, and Em opposi tion leader in the Federal Hous'e, 
dismissed his deputy Chief S.!•• Akintola, premier of Western 
Nigeria for his failure to carry out pa:rty pOlicies in his 
regional government. Chief Akintola and his supporters chose 
to form a new splinter party, the Nigerian National Democratic 
Party. At the same time" Chief Akintola refused to resign as 
the premier of the West on the grounds that he could only be 
dismissed from the premiership by a censure motion in the 
Western House of Assembly and the House of Chiefs. An attempt 
to move a censure motion in the Western House of Assembly 
12 
Chief Awolowo was the premier of Western Nigeria until 
1959 when he joined the Federal House to lead the opposition; 
and Chief Akintola was appointed to lead the regional govern­
ment. 
13 
The Action Group was a ruling party in the West, 1951­
62, in opposition in the East, the Midwest 1951-62, and in the 
Federal House 1959-64. 
18 
triggered a fight on the floor of the House. 'l.'he Federal Gov­
14 
ernment declared a state of emergency in the region and ap­
pointed an administrator, Dr. Moses Majakodemi. At this time 
. a plot to overthrow the Federal Government was discovered; 
and Chief Awolowo, Joseph Tarka, who was the leader of the 
united Middle Belt Congress and other prominent members of the 
Action· Group and its allies were accused of treasonable felony, 
and they were later jailed. Conditions of apparent normalcy 
returned to the West. Chief Akintola took the reins of govern­
ment without any election to test his popularity since the 
normal term of the vlestern House had not run out. The governor 
of the region, Sir Adesiji Aderemi, who had not supported 
Akintola, was remov~d from office, and a new man was installed. 
On both regional and natio~al levels the whole of 1965 
was a power struggle in Nigeria among the political parties. 
The Western House of Assembly was dissolved in 1965. Chief 
Akintola, with his party, formed an alliance with the Northern 
Peoples' Congress, while the Action Group allied itself with 
the National Council of Nigerian Citizens. During the election 
tension grew to a fever pitch. Balloting results showed Chief 
Akintola as the winner, but his party was immediately charged 
with rigging the election. The leader of the Action Group 
14 
The Federal Government was run by a coalition of two 

parties: the Northern Peoples' Congress which ruled in the 

North, and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens which 

ruled in the East and ~h the Midwest. 
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Alliance, Alhaji Adegbenro, occupied the State House only to 
be removed by the police. The loss of life and property in 
the rioting which followed the election was unprecedented, yet 
the Federal Government refused to intervene in the internal 
affairs of Western Nigeria. 
The boycott of the national election by the united Pro­
gressive Grand Alliance and the election crisis in the West 
precipitated yet another crisis. This crisis seems to indicate 
that some elements in Nigeria had lost faith with the ruling 
elite in the country. On January 15, 1966, a group of young 
army officers staged a revolution. The premier of the North 
and leader of the Northern Peoples' Congress, Sir Ahmadu Bello, 
his deputy and prime minister of Nigeria, Sir Tafewa Belewa, 
the premier of Western Nigeria and leader of the Nigerian 
National Democratic Party, Chief S.L. Akintola, and the Fed­
eral'Minister of Finance Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh were all 
assassinated. Nevertheless, the military spared some leading 
political figures from the purge--for example, the president 
of the Senate and acting president of the country, Dr. Nwafor 
Orizu, the premier of Eastern Nigeria and leader of the United 
Progressive Grand Alliance, Dr. Michael Okpara, and Chief 
Dennis Osadebay, the premier of the Hidwest. Since Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe, the President of the country was away on sick leave, 
the acting President, who was the highest ranking civilian 
official, presumably intimidated by the military coup, failed 
..' 
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to appoint an acting Prime Minister. The Federal Parliament 
was still in session, and it too, through the Cabinet, failed 
to appoint a civilian leader. Perhaps out of fear or for po­
litical reasons, the Federal Cabinet, presided over by Alhaji 
Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, decided to hand over the government 
to the army and the police. With the Acting President's 
announcement of this decision to the nation, the military coup 
d'etat successfully removed the civilian government and sus­
pended the operating framework of British democracy. 
The Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces, 
Major-General Ironsi assumed control of government and sus­
pended the Civil Constitution. ~yhis own instrument of power, 
he annulled the federal structure and instituted a unitary 
form of government such as the civilians had tried with the 
1951 Revised Constitution. The Unification Decree Number 34, 
which was issued on May 24, 1966 caused a reaction in the North 
where fear of Southern domination was strong. On May 29, 1966, 
some Northerners took to violence. Some Southerners were mur­
15 
dered, especially people from the East who lived in Sabon-Gari. 
Escapees fled to their homelands. This violence against the 
Easterners was probably due to the fact that Major-General 
15 
On the fringes of northern cities there are strangers' 
quarters; and the largest Sabon-Gari is in Kano. 
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Ironsi and most of his advisers came from the East. It can also 
be regarded as a reaction against the assassination of their 
tribal leaders. The North always had been a barometer indi­
cating the tempo of the country's socio-political progress and 
the violence there was probably an attempt to th\';1art the Major­
General's plans for a unitary state. 
As if the violence of some Northerners was not enough to 
forestall the newly announced program of t.he Major-General, on 
July 29, 1966 certain elements in the army undertook a coup 
d'etat. Major-General Ironsi, and the military governor of 
the West, Lieut.-Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi were murdered at Ibadan. 
On August 1, 1966 Lieut.-Colonel Yakubu Gowon from the Middle 
Belt in the North assumed the supreme command of the Nigerian 
Armed Forces and became head of t:-he Federal Military govern­
ment. Within the Nigerian army itself there was no unity; and 
it faced both a leadership struggle and the delicate task of 
determining the type of government by which the country was to 
be ruled. The head of the Federal Military Government, Major­
General Yakubu Gowon, restored the federal structure of govern­
ment. Furthermore, he re+eased from prison Chiefs Obafemi 
Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Efiong Okon Eyo and other politicians 
who had been jailed for treasonable felony and conspiracy by 
the earlier civilian government. 
The lack of unity in the army became increasingly obvious 
when the military governor of the East, Lieut.-Colonel Chuk­
22 
wuemeka Ojukwu wanted a type of government that would provide 
greater security and protection to the life and property of the 
Easterners. The May violence in the North and the July coup 
within the Nigerian army caused him to believe that the Federal 
Military Government, as constituted, was incapable of protect­
ing the people of the East. He felt, perhaps, that the East 
was a homogeneous state whose cause he could champion and thus 
determine its own destiny. He ordered all Easterners 'Vlho were 
residing in other parts of the country to return to the East. 
The East gained in population but in doing so put great 
16 
pr;essure on its limited £pace and economy_ On May 27, 1967 
the Federal Military Government created twelve states, three 
17 
of which were carved from the Eastern region. The long sought 
for objective of minorities in the country was thus realized. 
Lieut.-Colonel Ojukwu was thus denied the leadership of the 
whole East. Committed to the principle that the East was a 
homogeneous unit and insisting on championing its self-determi­
nation regardless of the minorities' feelings, Lieut.-Colonel 
16 
The landspace of the East was 29,484 square miles with 
a population of 12.4 million; and the more fertile areas are 
the fringes toward the southeast. Toward the southwest fringe 
are the creeks and oil wells. On the northern fringe is the 
coal field. The oil wells and the coal field"are Federal 
Government property leased to companies and corporations. 
17 
The three states are the East Central, the Rivers, and 
the South-Eastern. 
/ 
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Ojukwu declared his territory the Republic of Biafra and all­
nounced its secession from the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 
May 30, 1967. On July 7, 1967 the Federal troops invaded Bi­
afra, concentrating their attention to the minority areas-­
the Rivers and the South-Eastern States--which fell to the 
Federal forces during the early part of the Civil War. There 
was no doubt that some minorities supported Bi.afra, but it is 
clear that a great many of them rallied around the Federal 
Military Government. Self-determination of the minorities was 
a basic principle within the federation and this was granted 
them. The former civili.an government had ignored the claims 
18 
of the minorities. 
During the early part of the Civil War the Biafran forces 
undertook an expansionist strategy instead of defending the 
territorial area of the former Eastern region. Between August 
and. September 1967 the battle moved into the Midwest region 
which had been carved out of the Western region in 1963. The 
Biafran forces occupied the Midwest and declared it the Repub­
lic of Benin, but towards the end of September, the over-ex­
tended Biafran troops wer~ chased out of the Republic of Benin. 
The occupation of the Midwest probably was undertaken in part 
18 
In 1958 the Willink Commission set up solely for mi­
nority affairs reported that the fears of minorities exist in 
Nigeria, but it refused the creation of more states and, rather, 
recommended the Rivers area as a specialized region for develop­
ment by the Federal Government. 
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because Ojukwu wanted to offer protection and security to the 
Western Ibos--some members of Ojukwu's ethnic group who were 
cut off from those of the Eastern Region--and partly because 
the oil wealth of the Midwest would supply badly needed revenue 
for the war efforts. 
In time economic blockade and loss of food producing 
areas produced increasing starvation among the Biafrans. With 
the aid of an obliging foreign press Hajor-General Ojukwu 
aroused the conscience of the world. This support helped keep 
Biafra alive and thus sustained the war for over two years. 
The Republic of Biafra gained international recognition from 
Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Haiti. The recogni­
tion of Biafra was done either to put pressure on the Federal 
19 
Military Government to accept peace moves, or to give moral 
support to the besieged Biafra and thus embarrass the Federal 
Military Government. But all peace mediation efforts failed to 
end the conflict. Major-General Ojukwuwon the propaganda war­
fare part:icularly by his charge of "genocide", but the Federal 
forces ultimately had their victory on the battlefield. On 
January 11, 1970 General Ojukwu fled Biafra; he left the leader­
ship to Major-General Philip Effiong, the Chief of the General 
Staff, who capitulated on January 15, 1970. After thirty months 
19 
There were peace talks at Niamoey in Niger, Kampala in 
Uganda, and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. There were also peace 
moves by the Commonwealth Secretary and by the Organization of 
African Unity. 
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the biafranization of Nigeria came to a tragic end. Even though 
fighting for self-determination is at present going on in Chad 
and in the Sudan, the collapse of Biafra suggests that such ef­
forts are doomed to little success in this era. 'l'he support· of 
20 
members of the Organization of African Unity for a united Nigeria 
portrays that the majority of the African nations do not wish the 
readjustment of the artificial boundaries of their countries. 
20 
Tanzania, Gabon, Zambia and Ivory Coast, all members 
of the O.A.U., supported Biafra. But it is doubtful if they 
would support balkanization of their own c9untries. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PROBLEMS 01:" UNITY 
In the context of the foregoing discussion, we must ex­
amine the powerful cent.rifugal forces at \,lork in Nigeria and 
consider to what extent they are due to the actions of Great 
Britain as the colonizing power. From its inception, Nigeria 
was arbitrarily carved out from the various existing empires, 
1 
states and kingdoms. Part of the great empire of Kanem-Bornu 
was within the present borders of Nigeria. It also extended 
into present Niger and Chad, both formerly r'rench colonies. 
2 
The Fulani empire, which also extended into Niger, ruled most 
of the cattle and grain raising lands of the North before its 
conquest in 1906 by the British government. The subjec'cs of 
Kanem-Bornu empire recognized EI-Kanemi or the Shehu of Bornu 
as their leader; while in the Fulani empire the Sultan of So­
koto was regarded as the overlord. Within both of these em­
pires lesser lords--emirs":-ruled in each of the emirates. 
1 
Kanem was east of Lake Chad \,lhile Bornu was west of the 
lake. The empire was built around the lake; and it might have 
shifted its capitol in course of time. 
2 
The Fulani empire was originally the 14 Hansa states 
which were later conquered by the l:"ulani who became the over­
lords. 
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These two empires covered much of the grassland and semi-desert 
of Northern Nigeria. From their topographical condition, roll­
ing plain, these empires had every reason to cover an extensive 
area. The peoples of these empires took to cattle raising., 
moving from pasture to pasture. This nomadic life is still 
practiced by the Cow Fulani. Aside from cattle herding they 
undertook caravan trade in salt and leather. Thus, to all in­
tents and purposes most. of the people were nomads; and their 
empire and jurisdiction of their ruler had taken into account 
the conditions of nomadic life. In addition, there were those 
people who settled in towns such as the Settled Fulani. Perhaps 
Lord Lugard got his first experience of native rule from them. 
Nevert.heless, the Caravar. trade dominated every aspect of life 
of these peoples and linked much of the territories of the em­
pires to North Africa. By 1885 Sir George Taubman Goldie's 
3 
trading firm, the united Africa Company, dispatched its deputy, 
Joseph Thompson, to Sokoto. In an attempt to control the caravan 
trade Joseph Thompson signed a treaty of trade and jurisdiction 
with the Sultan of Sokoto. Thus he secured this vast empire 
for the British. An attempt was henceforth made to divert the 
3 
The United Africa Company was a combination of all 
British firms as they were advised by Goldie. Within a short 
time the company bought off the rival French trading firms and 
thus it became the Royal Niger Company in 1886, 'Itlhose spheres 
of influence covered much of Northern Nigeria. 
28 
Northern trade to the southern coast. This diversion of trade 
notwithstanding, the north has preserved something of the North 
African outlook with its O\-ln distinction as an ancient feudal 
empire. 
Aside from the savannah e.rnpires of the North, there was 
the forest kingdom of Benin in the South. The quality of 
Benin's arts is widely recognized and the trade of Benin had 
attracted the Portuguese from the earliest period of contact. 
Benin developed culturally and commercially while its ruler-­
the Oba of Benin--became an absolute monarch, especially in 
spiritual affairs. The people of Benin indulged in human 
sacrifice to ward off any misfortune. They also look to war­
fare for territorial expansion and booty. These actions of 
the Oba and his subjects alarmed the a.gents of the Niger Coast 
Protectorate who in 1897 sent qn emissary to Benin. The envoy 
was denied entry into Benin, and a British force wa.s called in. 
Although Benin was partially destroyed and Oba Overami was 
4 
captured, the ancient greatness of Benin is a source of pride 
to the Binis. 
Along the Guinea Coast was the Yoruba empire which teok 
most of Dahomey, a former French colony. In secular affairs 
5 
the empire was administered from Oyo, while the spiritual head­
quarters was at lIe Ife. Within the empire was the separate 
4 
Oba Overami t...as deposed and exiled to Calabar. He died 
in 1923. 
5 
Alafin of Oyo is a title given to the ruler, while Oni 

relates to the ruler of Ife, and Alake to that of Abeokuta. 
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Egba kingdom with its Alake of Abeokuta. The autonomy of Egba­
land was retained until 1914 when a treaty recognizing its in­
dependence was annulled and Indirect Rule was substituted. The 
Yoruba people did not stay in situ. Either as a result of their 
simple economy or as a result of intra-tribal wars the Yoruba 
continued to found city-states such as Ondo, Ijebu, Ibadan, 
Abeokuta, and Ilorin though the latter was conquered and occu­
pied by the Fulani in 1831. The internecine struggles of the 
Yoruba people led to the disintegration of the empire, but the 
Yoruba culture remains one of the most sophi$ticated in Nigeria. 
The European demand for slaves and palm oil allowed the 
growth of some city-states on the Niger delta. King Jaja of 
Opobo, King Pepple of Bonny and Nana of Istekiri, who inter­
fered with European penetration and trade expansion were removed 
6 
and deported by t~e British Consul. However, these city-states 
formed the nuclei of the new towns occupied by some minorities 
of the Niger Delta. Their demand for a separate state within 
the federation was a part of the irredentist movement that 
colored the politics of the regional based civilian gover~~ent. 
In addition to the city-states and the empires already 
mentioned there were Nupe'and Jukun kingdom of Kwarafa, as well 
as the kingdom of Idah which may have been an offshoot of the 
Jukun. The territorial areas of these ancient kingdoms are at 
6 
King Pepple was depcsedand exiled in 1854 but he 'Vlas 
restored in 1861. King Jaja was deported in 1887, while Chief 
Nana was removed in 1894. 
30 

present settled by some of the minority tribes of the Middle 
Belt of Northern Nigeria, that is, those groups which during 
the last civilian government demanded the creation of the Middle 
Belt State. The Hausa states of Gobir, Katsina, Daura, Kano; 
Zazzau (Zaria) Yauri, Kebbi and Zamfara were defeated by the 
Fu1ani Jihad of 1804. The Hausa and the Fu1ani developed a 
common culture and they present a homogeneity which is in con­
trast to what prevails elsewhere in Nigeria. Of course, within 
this homogeneity, Kano, a metropolis with highly sophisticated 
culture refused to be regarded as a fief of the Sardauna of 
Sokoto. It continued its defiance by demanding a separate Kano 
state; and it admitted within its emirate a political party 
based in the South. 
It should be observed that some of these ancient empires, 
city-states and kingdoms contain peoples who are still occupy­
ing their traditional territories. The Yorubas in Yoruba1and, 
the Binis (Edos) in Benin, the Nupes in Nupe kingdom, the Ka­
nuris in Bornu, and the Hausa-Fu1ani in the Fulani empire are 
all rooted into the areas of their ancient states. They remain 
attached to their own glo:::-ious past instead of identifying with 
Nigeria as a country. This land and people concept has signifi- . 
cant effects on social mobility, otherwise a great stimulus 
towards national unity. A member of another tribe who moves 
into a non-traditional homeland is regarded as a stranger who 
should live in Sabon-Gari. Although the lack of common his­
torical identity contributes to the absence of unity, it is 
really the relationship of the people within these ancient 
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city-states and empires with the central government that affects 
national unity. 
Some other African governments with similar problems have 
undertaken different measures to forge national unity. The 
Gold Coast, a former: British colony, changed its name to Ghana, 
an ancient empire within the present area of the country. But 
the ancient empire of Ghana did not extend to the northern 
part of the Gold Coast which was a part of the Ashanti empire. 
The Ashanti people in the northern territory showed a sepa­
ratist tendency but it was minimized by the one-party system 
in Ghana and the dictatorial rule of ex-President Nkrumah. The 
French Sudan assumed the ancient name of 14ali empire by joining 
with Senegal in 1959-61 in the Mali Federation. One might have 
hoped for the success of t.he Mali Federation since Senegal had 
been part of the rotali empire, and it had shared a common French 
colonial history and administration. In spite of such elements 
of common identity the Mali federation failed because the 
Senegalese felt that the union was dominated by the Sudanese. 
Above all, there was opposition to the federation by France and 
·the Ivory Coast. On the other hand, Uganda got its independence 
. with live-kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole, Karagwe and Buganda with­
in its borders. The British had not wanted to destroy these 
kingdoms as long as the kings and their subjects were loyal to 
the British monarch. But to foster national consciousness the 
president of Uganda, Milton Obote, drove into exile the last 
strong king of Buganda, K~bbak II. He disbanded the Kabbaka's 
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private army and he dissolved the king's parliament. Milton 
Obote undertook the dissolution of the live-kingdoms within his 
country. At present, it is too soon to accord full success to 
Obote's programme of national unity. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the memory of, or continued existence of ancient kingdoms 
within some African countries has caused problems of national 
coalescence and has been the source of mLlch discord with the 
central government. 
Within the artificial creation of Nigeria, a conglomer­
ate of ancient empires and city-states, live 250 officiallY 
recognized ethnic groups 'Ilit~ variations i.n tradition, culture,. 
language, loyalty and religion. It may be of interest to give 
a cross-section of distinctive traditions and customs in the 
country. The traditional kingdonl of Benin, now the Midwest 
State, and the Fulani empire of the north will be examined: 
A Bini deciding to become a Christian. Such a 
decision is not only the concern of the individual; 
it has repercussions on the wider family, especially 
if the person ..• is the head of one of Benin's extended 
family groups •••. Ancestor worship is stil, deeply 
rooted in the daily routine of the Bini ..•. The Fu­
lani ••. if he is a follower of Islam--fond of his Ko­
ran ••.. Many Fulani are however Pagan, with no marked 
tendencies for Islam but working out a life guided 
by instinct, superstition and animism••.• They will 
quickly vacate an area where one of -theIr people diee 
7 
Federal Ministry of Information, Nigeria 1960 A- Special 
Independent Issue of Nigeria Magazine, October 1960. (lo'ederal 
Government Printer, Lagos, Nigeria, 1960) p. 163. 
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Ibid. pp. 184-85 
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Within Nigeria there is accordingly no common tradition 
and culture on which modern nationalism could be based. The 
lack of unity of culture and tradition characteristic of Ni­
gerian society as a whole is even more pronounced among the 
elite who lead the country. The European Po'vers introduced 
into African society their standards of value and modes of 
life, mainly in the cities. The Africans in these urban cen­
ters have copied this European culture and sometimes they seem 
to become more Europeanized than the Europeans themselves. 
Progress towards civilization is even measured by how much of 
European culture these westernized Africans could adopt. But 
the imported culture fails to spread evenly and to dominate 
the country. The failure of the western oriented culture to 
replace fully native cultural traditions, or perhaps the failure 
of the two cultures to produce a 'workable almagam, affects the 
s~ability of the country. 
Likewise grea.t variation in religious beliefs has been 
detrimental to the unity of Nigeria. Between the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, Islam expanded rapidly into North Africa 
and the western Sudan. During the early part of the nineteenth 
century the European powers were looking for spheres of influ­
ence by means of geographical discovery and legitimate trade 
in Africa; and a revival of Islam expansion through holy wars 
9 
of jihads took place in Northern Nigeria. Uthman dan Fodio 
of the Fulani tribe became the leader of this reforming and 
9 
The late Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto and 
premier of Northern Nigeria was the grandson. 
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expansionistic Islamic movement. He appointed the fourteen 
flag bearers who spread the jihad with burning zeal in Northern 
Nigeria. Although the jihad was halted in Bornu by Mohammed 
el-Kanemi, the spread of Islam filtered in through the Fulani 
traders and herdsmen. Northern Nigeria became not only Islam­
ized but also Fulanized for the Fulani, having conquered 
Northern Nigeria, became the ruling class over other inhabit­
ants. The spread of Islam and Fulani overlordship penetrated 
the Yoruba state of Ilorin. Before the death of Uthman dan 
Fodio in 1817, much of Northern Nigeria was greatly influenced 
by Arabic-Islam imperialism. 
While the jihad spread in the North, the European traders 
and missionaries established stations in the South. By 1836, 
the Church Missionary Society gained influence in Abeokuta in 
Yorubaland. Betvleen 1841 and 1852 the Church Missionary Society 
and the Wesleyan Methodists were very active sowing seeds of 
European religious imperialism in Lagos, Badagry and much of 
Yorubaland in Western Nigeria. By 1846 the Church Missionary 
Society crossed the Niger into the East and opened a station 
at Calabar. In 1886 the Irish Catholic Missionaries undertook 
evangelization in Onitsha in Iboland. During the early part of 
the nineteenth century the South moved towards European re­
ligious values and the North embraced the Islamic culture. 
There is another. interesting' aspect concerning the geo­
'graphic distribution of religious beliefs in Nigeria. By 1900, 
when Lord Lugard became t.he high commissioner of the North, he 
35 
supported the treaty of the Royal Niger Company which did not 
allow Christian missionaries to penetrate into the Muslim North, 
unless such missionaries were invited by the emirs. The 
Christian missionaries were encourag~d to evangelize in the 
pagan Middle Belt of the North. Between 1903 and 1905 the 
Church Missionary Society was invited by the emirs of Bida and 
Zaria to open Christian stations in their emirates. Thus with­
in the North there are pockets of Christians as there are of 
pagans. In the South, likewise, there are enclaves of paganislll 
and Islam. When the population of Nigeria is examined, about 
44 percent of -the people are Moslems, t1hile 22 percent are 
Christians. The remainde:c stick to their traditional cults, 
But when the geographical distribution of religion is examined, 
the North is two-thirds Moslem, while the South is Christian 
and pagan. , I: 
The North as an Islamic bloc detaches the region from ,I 
the country and tends to link itself ,'lith the Arab world and 
other African Islamic countries. It may be of interest to 
point out that the late Sarduana of Sokoto, Premier of Northern 
Nigeria, Vice-President of the World Islamic Congress and 
President General of the Northern Peoples' Congress, denied 
the government of Israel participation in a fishing industry 
in Lake Chad, despite the fact that the development program il 
was offered by Israel to the Federal Government. The civilian 
government was forced to respect such a geographical ban since 
Lake Chad is within the jurisdiction of the North. But the ban 
II 
I 
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of Israel in the North was embarassing to other regional and 
Federal Governments \ihich maintained cordial relations \'lith the 
Israeli government. Thus the religious divisions in Nigeria 
complicate foreign relations of the country and endanger the 
unity of the federation. 
In the Christian South, especially in the East, denomi­
national differences sometimes flare up as when in 1965 Catho­
lies opposed the East Regional Government's plan to take over 
education. During the Civil War 1967-69 the Biafrans believed 
that they were fighting a war against the Moslem North and 
therefore they appealed to all the Christian countries of the 
world for aid to restrain Islamic advancement at the expense 
of the Christian East. Since the East was t\<To-thirds Catholic, 
many people of the Catholic faith readily accepted humanitarian 
arguments regarding the np.cessity of keeping Biafra alive, and 
thus, wittingly or unwittingly, aided an attempt to dism@.mber 
the Federation. It is easy to conclude that religious loyalty 
is very strong in Nigeria and stands in the way of national 
unity. 
For comparative purposes, Sudan, the former Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, also presents a case of disunity arising from the dis­
tribution of religious beliefs. A civil war seldom mentioned 
in the world press is going on between the North and the South. 
In the North the people are mostly Moslems and of Arabic cul­
ture. In the South some people are Christians while others 
practice their traditional beliefs. The Southerners also feel 
. that they have Afri.can consciousness. 1-.t present the South is 
, 
I 
. I 
II 
I 
J \ , 
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rebelling against the Moselm-Arab-culture dominated government 
of the North. It is true that cultural variation plays a part 
in Sudanese disunity, but the control of government by the Mos­
lem North suggests that emphasis must be put on religious dif­
ferences. During the era of British administration, Moslem 
preachers met restrictions in the South while Christian mis­
sionaries were encouraged. Arabic language and influences 
10 
were also restricted in the South. But with Sudanese indepen­
dence the Moslem-dominated government tried to Arabicize 
education and it aroused more resentment from the South. It 
is true that the Arabisation of education would have contributed 
towards national consciousness, but at the same time, it may 
be regarded as cultural and religious imperialism. It is 
possible to blame the British administration for its restric­
tion of Moslem proselytes in the South and thus failure to 
press for an integration. Since th~ Moslem-dominated govern­
ment failed to adopt a federal constitution as advocated by 
the Sudan African National Union, one of the oldest political 
parties in the South, not all blame can be laid at the feet of 
the imperial powers. The Anya Nya--guerrilla fighters--have 
taken to the forest to fight and liberate the South. 
Another case in point of religious differences as a 
factor of unity is that of Ethiopia, the oldest independent 
10 
George W. Shepherd, Jr. "National Integration and the 
Southern Sudan." . The Journal of Modern African" S"tudies Vol. 4 : 
!..:... p. 200. 
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kingdom in Africa. By 1833 It"aly ent.ered the eastern sector of 
Ethiopia and occupied what came to be called Eritrea. In 1889 
Italy and Ethiopia signed a treaty to define the boundary of 
Eritrea. Italy was not satisfied with Eritrea and in its 
attempt to occupy other areas of Ethiopia, Italy fought the 
battle of Adowa in 1896 in which it was defeated. In spite of 
the Italian defeat it still maintained Eritrea. After the 
Second World War Eritrea was given as a trust territory to 
Ethiopia; but in 1952 .Eritrea was joined to Ethiopia after a 
plebiscite. In Ethiopia, from very ancient times, most of 
the people are Ethiopian Orthodox Christians. Within Eritrea, 
the Tigreans are Ethiopian Orthodox; along the coast, the Afar 
and the Danakil are ~loslems. At present the Eritrean Moslems 
are pursuing a liberation movement which endangers the unity 
of Ethiopia. It may be remarked in passing that if the Eri­
trean Liberation Movement and the Sudanese African Liberation 
Union succeed, Afro-Arab unity in African countries may well 
be endangered. 
Where there is a large concentration of some religious 
.belief, even if the believers \'1ere formerly ruled by two 
different colonial administrations, national unity can be 
attained rather easily. Italian Somaliland and British Somalia 
were colonized by two different' European powers. But there is 
a large concentration of Moslems in both countries. There is 
the same Arab culture and language. British Somalia was granted 
independence in 1960 and within the year Italian Somaliland 
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gained its freedom. On July 1, 1960, without much fanfare, the 
two national assemblies formed an independent Republic of So­
malia. At present there is the French Somaliland outside the 
Republic, and there are some Somalis in the northern provinces 
of Kenya, the Haud and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia. Pan Somalia 
. may be the next alternative although such option may result in 
conflict with the neighboring countries. However, the national 
consciousness of Somalia is only delayed by differing colon.ial 
administrations. 
!National consciousness may also be developed where reli­
gious beliefs are evenly spread out. (Of course there may be 
other factors such as the consensus of opinion Of the national 
leaders.) Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar were formeL 
German colonies which after the First World War were given to 
Great Britain as Trust territories. There are pagans, Moslems 
and Christians in both countries. In 1961 the mainland of 
Tanganyika was granted independence: and in 1963 Zanzibar was 
decolonized. In 1964 the two heads of state agreed to unify 
the two independent countries into the Republic of Tanzania. 
Of course national unity may be achieved in spite of 
differing religious beliefs. The idea of a common empire his­
tory well directed by the national leaders, for example, may 
activate national consciousness. Such a case of national unity 
achieved despite religious diversity is that of the two Cam­
eroons. Northern and Southern Cameroons were former German 
colonies which had been administered as one country. After 
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t.he First World War, Northern Cameroon was divided into two 
sections. The \'lestern part, close to Nigeria, was given to 
Great Britain as a trust. terri t.ory; and. it was administered as 
a part of Northern Nigeria. A plebiscite conducted in 1961 
allowed this section of the northern Cameroons to be integrated 
with Nigeria, and it <;'1as named the Sardauna Province. The 
east sector of the Northern Cameroons was administered by 
France as a trust territory. The Southern Cameroons were ad­
ministered as a. trust territory and as an administrative part 
of Eastern Nige~ia. Between 1957 and 1950 the Southern Came­
roons became a quasi-territory. An 1961, after the indepen­
dance of Nigeria, a plebiscite was held in the Southern 
Cameroon and it decided to join the former French trust terri­
·tory of Northern Cameroon, which had received its independence 
in 1960 • .!Within the Northern Cameroon, now Eastern Cameroon, 
Moslems predominate with some Christians and pagans; while in 
the Southern Cameroon, now Western Cameroon, Christians pre­
dominate, but there are pagans and only very few Moslems. 
Despite a mixed distribution of religious beliefs and a past 
history of SUbjection to two colonial pOi'mrs, the ·two Cameroons-­
Western and Eastern--have formed a urdted republic. However, 
in this case both t.erritories had shared a common German co1on­
ia1 background; the memory of this, perhaps, gave the inhabi­
tants grounds for believing that the French and the British 
:1"had willfully divided them. The unification of the two Came­
roons, despite different religious faiths, language, colonial 
il 
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administrations, culture, and above all, ethnic groups, is a 
challenge to other Africa.l1 countries that all too easily blame 
European powers for their internal disunity. 
National unity is not necessarily created on the basis 
of a common religious belief. Once again Nj.geria supplies an 
illustration of this condition. Within Northern Nigeria, two­
thirds of the people are l-1oslems. Thus in nearly all the 
emirates, with the exception pf the Middle Belt area, there is 
a concentration of Islamic adherents who should hold together. 
But in the last cbtilian government the Kano emirate failed to 
support the regional secular and spiritual leader. Alhaji 
Aminu Kano based the Nigerian Elements Progressive Union in 
Kano as an opposition party to the Northern regional govern­
ment. A Southern-based political party--the Action Group-­
was allowed to campaign in Kano during the 1959 Federal elec­
tion. Along with the Middle Belt, Kano demanded a separate 
state in an attempt to subdivide the northern region. In 
1953, the first riot between the northerners and the southern­
ers took place in Kano city: and in 1966 the massacre of some 
people of Eastern Nigerian origin also occurred in the city. 
A close examination of the composition of the population of 
K~no emirate shows a large concentration of Hausas who were 
the overlord~ of Northern Nigeria until conquered by the 
Fulani during the Jih~d in 1803. Although the Fulani stmse­
quently adopted the Hausa language, there seems to be resent­
ment wherever Rausa consciousness remains strong. Furthermore, 
i .i.'. ¥. V' 
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Kano City is the most sophisticated city in the North. It has 
.the largest Sabon Gari on its outskirts. It is an old caravan 
trade center and a modern commercial place. Since the con­
struction of its international airport it has become the great­
est metropolis of the North. The special characteristics of 
Kano strongly suggest that growing sophistication weakens the 
support of traditional religion as a unifying force. 
With the exception of Northern Nigeria, where Rausa is 
widely spoken, each ethnic group in Nigeria has its own langu­
age. In many cases the only common language is English. Even 
though English is the official language of Nigeria, it is not 
the lingua franca of the illiterate masses. This impedes the 
communication and dissemination of political ideas both within 
the regions and across regional and tribal lines. The country 
as such is divided into language blocs. Nevertheless, the use 
of English as a common medium of expression by the educated 
Nigerians has produced national consciousness within that group_ 
Perhaps, if during the sixty years of British occupation of 
the country the colonial administration had aimed at cultural 
imperialism and seriously t.ried to spread English culture 
throughout t.he country, nat.ional unity would not now be plagued 
by some of its present problems. But, of course, the British 
would have been accused of dest::roying the nat.i\7e language and I ' 
I 
culture, and of trying to turn Africans into Englishmen. 

The failure of cultural assimilation as a unifying force 

can be especially well examined ~n the former French West 
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Africa, comprising Senegal, Sudan, Hauretanfa, Upper Volta, 
Niger, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Dahomey. Between 1902 and 1904 
French laws allowed these colonies to be grouped and admin­
istered as a unit with headquarters at Dakar in Senegal. 
Fortunately there was no other European colony that intervened 
disruptively. To be sure, the former British colonies in West 
Africa were interspersed among the French territories, but 
French West Africa constituted a bloc extending from the coast 
inland to join other French colonies of North Africa. The 
French system of direct administra.tion refused to recognize 
African life and the colonial administrators \\?orked hard to 
make Frenchmen out of the Africans under their control. Afri­
can children were taught French and French culture. The 
entirety of French west Africa received one language and cul­
turei as a result, one might have thought French West Africa 
11 
would have maintained its unity after independence. Yet in­
dependence was no sooner granted to each of the countries than 
the federali.zed structure collapsed. Apparently, French West 
Africa was only a house of cards held together by French pres­
11 
In September 1958 President Charles de Gaulle offered 
the colonies a chance to hold a referendum so that they could 
choose between becoming self-governing republics within a 
French community and complete independence. Member colonies 
of French West Africa and Equatorial Africa voted to remain 
as republics, but Guinea, a member of E'rench West Africa, 
voted for complete independence. In 1959 Senegal and Sudan 
formed the Mali federation and demanded complete independence. 
Shortly thereafter other members demanded complete indepen­
dence; the French community went defunct. The Mali Federation 
was dismantled. French West Africa and Equatorial Africa 
became fragmented. 
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ence. The French language and culture seem to have been suc­
cessfu11y imposed on the younger generation, but the older 
generation, importrult sustaining factors of tradition and 
stability, were left out. It seems clear that African life 
continued beneath the French superstructure. The elements of 
unity introduced by the French in French West Africa did not 
suffice to produce a lasting national consciousness in the face 
of the continuity of native African differences. 
There is yet another centrifugal force working against 
national unity in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. Some tribal 
groups cross regional lines within Nigeria with the result that 
a.given people may be divided under two different political 
administrations; for example, the Yoruba in I10rin, a part of 
Northern Nigeria and the bulk of Yoruba in the Western region, 
and the Ibo in Eastern region and a part in the Midwest. All 
these peoples had been settled in the different areas for a 
very long time, but in more recent times Ibos migrated to the 
12 
North. The September Massacre in 1966 confirmed the weakness 
of Nigerian unity when confronted by social and tribal or 
regional tensions. The effect of long-standing cross-regional 
settlement can be observed in the Nigerian civil war in which 
the Ibos of the Republic of Biafra (Eastern Region) were in 
league with the Ibos of the Republic of Benin (Miawest). 
Cross-regional settlement of ethnic groups in Nigeria is the 
12 ~. 

Some Ibos were murdered in the North. 
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cause of much friction. Perhaps ,the present creation of more 
states ,.;here some tribes are g-1.ven states of their own will 
mtnimize the friction. 
It may also be remarked that some ofehe tribal groups 
run across international boundaries so that there are the 
Yorubas in Dahomey, and the Hausas and Fulani in Niger and 
the Cameroons. The problem of cross-regional ties then can 
have international implications. For instance, the Action 
Group party which governed the bulk of the Yoruba in \\'cstern 
region suggested in 1960 the incorporation of the Yorubas of 
Dahomey as the fourth region in Nigeria, and the Dahome,iran 
13 
Yorubas r3ceived the idea f;:rYorably. This suggests quite 
clei..'\rly that some Nigerian tribes think of territorial agg.1':an­
dizement which is likely to be a source of conflict and po­
litical disunity. 
Nigeria is not the only nation in Africa 'tvhere tribal 
groups run across international boundaries. There are Somali 
communities in eastern Ethiopia, in the northern district of 
Kenya and in French Somaliland, although the bulk of the Somali 
. live in the Republic of Somalia. The r.1asai people a.re located 
in Kenya and in Tanzania. In Morocco, Ifni, Rio de Oro, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya anq Mauretania there are Berbers and 
Bedouin tribesmen. As a r~sult of such patterns of mixed 
settlement, some Afric.an countries have quarrelled and fought 
13 
I. William Zartman~"ThePolitics of ,Boundaries in 
North 	and West Africa," The J'ournal 'Of Hodern Afrie'an Studies. 
(Cambridge University Pres$, 1965) Vol. 3:2, p. 170. 
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about their frontiers. Algeria and Morocco, Ethiopia and So­
malia, Kenya and Somalia, Ghana and Togo, just to name a fe\"l, 
have all faced border disputes arising from the geographic 
spread of a people. This division of a people between two or 
three countries has frequently beE:1:ll blamed on the Eurc..)pean 
powers, that is African countries are said to have been arti­
ficially created without regard to the African feelings. HO~i-
ever, the European powers which colonized Africa should not 
receive all of the blame. The Bedouin, t:b.e Masai and the 
Hausa-Fulani are nomsQic herdsmen and caravan traders. The 
traditional African economy of sedentary agriculture and 
cattle herding moved some of the African tribesmen a'l.Yay from 
their traditional homelands; they could not multiply and stay 
in si'tu. To some of the tribes the. homeland 'vas wherever food 
and good pasture could be obtained, or perhaps ",here a profit­
able market could be located. 'I'heir boundaries of a tribal 
unit followed a seasonal moving frontier; they did not define 
themselves within any fixed 'state'. The geographically con­
ditioned mobility of some African tribes fragmented them as 
14 . 
. semi-stateless people, though of course it did not destroy 
their sense of totem and the sense of belong.ing to a tribe. 
In some cases it was not the European powers which 
divided a truly unified ethnic group. For instance, the king­
14 
It does not mean anarch but it means lack of boundary 
limitation. 
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doms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and KarRgl,A,Te we.re tied together 
to become economically and politically viable. African $ociety 
was fluid; some tribes such as the Yoruba had a past history of 
intra-tribal quarrels and wars. As a result of such quarrels 
and intra-tribal wars, there Wert:! offshoots of a tribal group 
which settled outside the ancestral home area under a new 
leadership. For instance, Abeokuta in Egbals.nd was f01..mded in 
1830 by Yoruba refugees f~om Ibadan. They called themselves 
the Egbas even though a branch of the Yoruba people. The 
spread of the Yorubas and some other African tribes was due to 
wars or disobedience to their tribal leader who might 'chen 
force them to .round a ne\'1 homeland outside the terrib:>rlal 
area. 
Another factor of great importance which transferred 
some African tri.bes to other areas and thus encouraged the 
easy breakthrough of artificial boundaries by the European 
powers was the internal slave trade as well as the slave trade 
across the Sahara Desert, both of which had existed before the 
advent of the European powers. Constant warfare for slave 
raids caused waves of migration of people to well protected 
15 
areas. In the former Eastern region there are the Eastern 
Ibibio Ikono people in Anang province while the bulk of Ibibio 
15 
Migration of people occurred in historic times in 
Africa. It might have been caused by demand for food and land 
hunger, by flood, by superstitious beliefs, by trade and by a 
desire for protection against a.'l aggressive neighbor. 
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people live in uyo province. The wars instigated by the Euro­
pean powers themselves in their efforts to subjugate certain 
areas also caused waves of migration, for example the French 
war with Futa Toro State in 1817, Faidherbe conflict with al-
Haji Umar in 1857, an.d the Fulani war with Britain between 
1901 and 1906. 
When the European powers had once established fixed 
boundaries for their colonial possessions, some African tribes 
that had moved away from their homeland were no longer able to 
return. Most of the European administrators were not experts 
in anthropology and sociology and did not understand the tri­
bal cultures and lineage. A great many of the administrators 
were Eoldiers sent as officials, often as a result of govern­
mental patronage~ and what interested them was strict disoi­
pline. They insisted on forcing some of the nomadic African 
tribes to settle against their 'will. Most of the European 
administrators did no·t know the language of the tribal states 
in which they worked. Guided by the sense of a "mission" of 
representing a higher civilization the agents of the European 
powers decide1 on what was good enough for the Africans. It 
was not that {he Africans har no states but such states did 
not limit the movement of pebple outside the frontier. The 
state was the influence of a recognized ruler along with the 
loyalty of the sUbjects. Thus the application of the European 
idea of a state to African tribes ignored the lfrican modes of 
life which were in conformity with their basicleconomy. 
I 
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It may be remarked that some European powers, for instance 
Great Britain, after it had claimed Nigeria, did try to trace 
the lineage of some tribes and to reg~oup them. Be~ween 1920 
and 1930 the British made a survey of the various totems of 
groups of people mainly in the Eastern provinces where a 
s'trongly organized ind1genou,s goverrunent cove.r:ing a large area 
was non-existent. Wherever the totems \-rere identical these 
people were grouped under the same clan with a clan council and 
a paramount chief.. It might be argued that. such r~grouplng 
came late and of course did not bring into one fold those 
people of the same totem who lived either In the French or the 
German territories. The primary purpose of this reorganization 
was not to re-settle the 'nomadic' tribesmen of the area for 
their own good, but to make it easy for the administrators to 
supervise them. Even so, it was a step in the right direction. 
The people needed a sense of a large core area as an element of 
governmental jurisdiction. Of course this structure of admin·­
istrative units covering extensive areas presents another 
problem for national unity. 
The problem of enclaves of minorities within regions 
dominated by a pow~rful tribe that is in the majority exists 
for many African countries. !n Kenya there are the Kikuyu who 
are in the majority, and the Luo, the Masai, the Kipsigis and 
the Gusii who are minorities. In Uganda, the Bakanda are in 
the majority while the Teso, the Acholi, the Banyoro and the 
Ganda are all minorities. 
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In Northern Nigeria the Hausas are 5~ million, the Fulani 
3 million, the Kanuri l!:i million •. In Western Nigeria are the 
Yorubas 4~ million; the Edo 452,000; the Western Ibo 374,000 
and the Urhobo 346,000, though at present the last three named 
tribes are in the Midwest state. In East Nigeria there are 
I 
the Ibo 4 million, the Ibibio 750,000, the Annang 450,000 and 'i 
16 Ithe Ijaw 265,000. The dominant tribes obtained control of 
political power in each such region; the policy of regional 
government became a source of tribal rivalry and aroused con­
stant fear in the minorities. Between 1957 and 1958 the 
Minorities Commission was appointed. The Willink Commission 
admitted that 'there were fears of tribal domination and dis­
crimination. But the Willink Commission was strongly against 
the creation of new states in Nigeria, even though in most of 
the minority areas there were movements favoring separate 
. 17 
statehood such as the Middle Belt, the Benin Delta and the 
Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers states. In 1943 Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
then leader of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, and 
later the Governor-General and President of· Nigeria, had 
suggested the regrouping of Nigeria into eight political ad­
ministrative units. In 1953 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader 
of the Action Group and later the Premier of Western Nigeria II 
wanted a division of Nigeria into nine states. But in 1957 , 
I 
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The name was changed to the Midwest State, which was 

the only state created out of the Western Region in 1963. 
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Dr. Azikiwe in a speech at ADa opposed the creation of ne\>T 
states at the expense of Eastern Nigeria. The colonial govern-
ment,on the other hand, felt that not more than one new state 
should be created from each region and that it must be econom­
16 
ically and politically viable. Western Nigeria agreed to the 
principle of permitting ·the :;-eparatlon of minorities by 
creating of new states, not only in the West but ir. other 
regions as well. The North and the East opposed the bulkan­
. ization of their regions. British government was paralysed 
in its efforts to cater to the self-determination of the 
minorities and left them to the mercy of the majority tribes. 
But Her Majesty's Government saw to it that constitutional 
guarantees were provided to allay the fears of the minorities 
befox'e it granted independence to the country. However I the 
interpretation of such constitutional guarantees was left to 
the majority tribes that controlled the government. It is 
really doubtful whether Great Britain and other European powers 
in Africa experienced minority problems during their adminis­
tration. France was busily engaged in cultural assimilation 
of the Africans and they were even given French citizenship. 
Thus no tribe was in the position ~o dominate other5. If there 
were such tribal cultural dominance it was dormant. Great 
Britain by its indirect rule aLso restricted the dominance of 
18 
The colonial gover~ent suggested the delay of 
independence for two years in order to attend to the wishes of 
the minorities. But the major political parties failed to 
listen. 
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ana tribe. over another. Each ·::lari which was a sub-division of 
a tribe had its own leader who directed the institutions of the 
clan; and there was no fear of tribal or ctan subordination. 
Though Great Britain is at times accused o~ having favored the 
dominance of Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria, and Bakanda in Uganda, 
the British generally act.ed as a paternal administrator and 
saw no purpose in awakening the fears of minorities. It seems 
that the acute development of minority fears arose towards the 
end of the colonial era with the hanning of government authority 
into the hands of the majority which can come from one tribe 
and be strongly inclined to ignore the wishes of others. 
Furthermore, it came up because of the type of political parties 
which assumed political leadership and the slogans they used. 
It is important to examine the political parties and the 
cultural organizations which reveal the political anatomy of 
Nigeria most clearly. The development of political parties in 
Nigeria has been regional and accordingly reflects local and 
tribal jealousies. During the Second World War many cultural, 
literary and professional associations were formed in Lagos. 
There were also some social clubs and one or two political 
19 
parties such as the Young Democrats. In August 1944 most of 
these associations and clubs federated as the National Council 
of Nigeria and the Cameroons. Fro~ its composition it seems 
19 . 
It was a youth wing of the Nigerian National Democratic 
Party formed by Herbert Marcauly and based only in Lagos. 
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that the N.C.N.C. had few immediate political pretensions, but 
it did generate nationalistic feelings against the British. 
The Ibo Union--a cultural o~ganization to promote the advanced 
education of Ibo--had been formed in 1936. It became a member 
of the N.C.N.C. By 1948, its leC;;l.der Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe became 
the president of both the N.t~.N.C. and the Ibo Union. The 
N.e.N.C. had many offshoo'.;s in Iboland in Eastern Nigeria. 
Because of the strong ties between the rbo State Union and the 
N.C.N.C. the Egbe Orno Oduduwa--a Yoruba cultural association 
founded in London in 1945--developed more Yoruba-oriented 
nationalism after it moved its base to Lagos in 1948. In 
March 1951 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Secretary-General of 
Egbe Omo Oduduwa set up a political wing, the Action 'Group, 
in order to gain control of the Western House that was estab­
lished under the Macpherson Constitution of 1951. Under this 
c9nstitution, Lagos, the Federal capital was made a part of 
Western Nigeria. Dr. Azikiwe vainly opposed the incorporation 
of Lagos; it cost him his constituency and seat in the Central 
Legislature. He moved to the East and strengthened the N.C.N.C. 
He was then elected in Onitsha constituency to the Eastern 
House where he became the premier of the region in 1953-59. 
In December 1949 a cultural organization to embrace all nor­
therners was formed in Kano. In 1951 the Northern Peoples' 
Congress became more openly political in emphasis and it gained 
control of the Northern Region House of Assembly established by 
the Macpherson Constitution. The Action Group was the only 
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organization formed expressly as a poli.tical party, although it 
stood to oppose Dr. Azikiwe, who personified the threat of Ibo 
domination. The N.P.C. became a political party to prevent the 
two southern political parties from dominating the North and. 
shaping the new federal constitution of 1951 to their own ad-
vantage~ The N.C.N.C. originally seemed to be the only broadly 
based organization, but it was much too loosely federated to 
maintain a common political ideology. It is true that it 
"attacked British colonialism, but by 1951 it was dominated by 
the Ibo State Union and correspondingly diverted its strength 
to the East. 
. "" 
In Northern Nigeria, the non-Moslem and non-Hausa-Fulani 
in the Middle" Belt formed the united Middle Belt Congress in 
1955 with the goal of creating the Middle Belt State and thus 
escaping from Fulani-Hausa domination. Shortly after its 
formation the UMBC broke into two faction: the Middle Zone 
League which supported the N.P.C.; and the Middle Belt Peoples' 
Party which was allied to the N.e.N.C. and the Northern Ele-
rnents Progressive Union. In 1950 some young northerners broke 
·away from the NPC and they formed a pol.itical party, the 
Northern Elements Progressive Union in 1952. They attacked the 
northern emirs· and their authority which they claimed was con-
servative. The NEPU was really a political party desiring to 
oppose and to reform the NPC. Its leader, Aminu Kana, thus 
appealed to all the dissenters of the No~th. Based in Kano, 
the NEPU advocated a united. Nigeria instead of the regional 
55 
ideas pf the NPC. While the NEPU was an ally of the N.C.N.C., 
the UMBC allied itself to the Action Group. The AG and the 
N.C.N.C. failed to establish themselves in Northern Nigeria 
apart from becoming allies of splinter parties. In this role 
the two major parties of the South had to appeal to a wider 
variety of issues and more divergent elements than they other­
wise would have to do. 
In the minority area of the Eastern Region, the united 
National Independence Party ,,,ith Dr. Udoudoma as one of its 
leading members became established. ~ince some of the leading 
members of the party belonged to the IbibioState Union--a 
cultural organization formed in 1928 for educational advance­ , 
ment--there is reason to believe-that it served to defe.nd 
minority interests against Ibo domination. The united National 
Independence Party sponsored a mO'lement to form a new state 
that would have embraced all the minority areas of Calabar, 
Oqo)a and Rivers. The COR State-Movement became anti-N.C.N.C.; 
and the"UNIP more or less inevitably became an ally of the 
Action Group. In 1957 the Action Group-UNIP gained 18 seats 
from the COR state area while the N.C.N.C. obtained only 17. 
The COR state movement and the UNIP were regarded as for­
mentors of ill feeling against the N.C.N.C. and as generators 
of hatred against the Ibos as well. During the East Regional 
20 
election campaign of 1962 the COR Advocate press was burnt. 
20 
Some Nigerian political parties maintained thugs, a 
group of undesirables, jailbirds, noted criminals, able-bodied 
unemployed young men and they could do anything during campaign. 
On electioneering and rallies they went as pressmen and 
musicians. They acted" as secret security officers for certain 
members of the party. 
I 
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Pressure forced the TJNIP to disband. As a result the COR 1\ 
state movement went underground opposing the sominant body­
politic of the Eastern Region. When the Rivers and the South­
eastern states wp.re created in 1967 by Yakubu Gowan, the Head 
of the Federal Military Government, the separatist feeling of 
the minorities was given expression, as it was minority prob­
lems that were one of the causes of the Civil War. 
Although the'Action Group had passed a resolution in 
1955 favoring the creation of the Midwest state, the Yoruba 
people in the Western Region were not united as a party. 
There were some N.C.N.C. supporters in the West, but it was 
not their stronghold and at times what happened to N.C.N.C. 
supporters in the West reverberated on Action Groupers in the 
East. Sometimes there were open conflicts between the sup­
porters of these two ,parties in both regions. In 1958 Alhaji 
Adgoke Adelabu, one of the strong supporters of the N.C.N.C., 
had an automobile accident at Shagamu Square, Ibadan, as a 
result of which he later died. His accidental death caused 
killing, property destruction and fighting between members of 
the Action Group and the N.C.N.C. In 1962 Dr. Michael Okpara, 
the leader of the N.C.N.C. came on an election campaign to 
Uyo North in the East, the constituency of Chief Efiong Okon 
Eyo who was leader of the Action Group. The electioneering 
produced killing, destruction of property and fighting among 
the N.C.N.C., the police and the Action G~oup. Chief Eyo was 
arrested, later tried and jailed, but he won the election in 
I I 
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jail, while all this was going on, the Action Group in Western· 
Nigeria faced an internal crisis in 1962. The premier of the 
region and deputy leader of the Action Group was ousted by the 
leader of the Action Group, Chief Obafemi A.wolo\OTo. Chief S.A. 
Akintola immediately formed a new party to entrench himself in 
power. Nigeria became a multi-party and multi-tri.bal society. 
None of the Nigerian political parties have ever had a 
strong foothold countrywide; whenever any of them crosses 
regional lines it has been regarded as a troublemaker and a 
danger to regional security. When any of these parties make 
inter-regional alliances, the leaders and supporters of the 
parties that co-operated with a 'foreign' regional party have 
been persecuted. The witch-hunting tactics used against such 
'foreign' parties obscured the fact that the major party of 
each region was actually persecuting members of minority 
tribes of that region who belonged to thes,e parties. The 
political parties were handicapped in the 'diffusion of ideas 
beyond regional lines and tended to become established as the 
voice of a particular ethnic group in a given governmental 
region. In 1964 in order to face the general Federal election 
the NPC and the NNDP joined to form the Nigerian National 
Alliance while the N.C.N.C., the AG, the UMBC and the NEPU 
formed the united Progressive Grand Alliance. But the par­
ticularistic tendency of the Nigerian political parties from 
I 
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1951 to 1963 had already affected the unity of the country_ 
The Alliance developed on the eve of the Federal election was 
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a marriage of convenience. After the 1964 Federal election 
the leadership of the country fell to the Nigerian National 
Alliance, the mainspring of which was the Northern Peoples' 
21 
Congress that had ruled the country since 1959. The boycott 
of the 1964 Federal election by the UPGA revealed that Nigerian 
political parties could net work in harmony, and that 
regionalism was triumphant. 
The Federal Parliament became controlled by the region­
ally based dominant political party of the North, the NPC, and 
the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group which it pri.marily represented. 
This situation threatened other regional governments, parties 
and major ethnic groups. In short, the Federal Parliament 
became the focal point for inter-:regional political differences. 
The result was turbulence. The Federal Parliament controlled 
by the NPC with the aid of i·ts junior partner the N.C.N.C. I 
declared a state of emergency in the Western Region and dis·­
solved the regional government in 1962. This was the prelude 
to a series of crises in that region. After six months of 
emergency administration the Federal government returned power 
to Akintola's faction which then allied itself with the Northern 
Peoples' Congress. Events in Western Nigeria were really a test 
case concerning how the Federal government would conduct itself 
and if it could maintain the unity of the country. Akintola's 
21 
Many members of the NNA in the North were returned 
unopposed before the election day. The fact is there were some 
UPGA candidates in such constituencies who were unable to file 
election papers. The UPGA, therefore, felt that the election 
was rigged and boycotted it. 
II 
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new party, the Ntgerian National Democratic Party, ruled 
Western Nigeria for three years without any election, despite 
popular demand for one. In October, 1965, the Akinto1a Govern­
. ment finally conducted an election, but it was at once accused 
of rigging and other malpractice. At this point, the opposi~ 
tion party, the Action Group countered with a full scale ram­
page, killing and destroying the property of some of Akinto1a's 
supporters. The opposition party even went so far as to set 
up a rival government. The NPC controlled Federal Government 
just stood by watching this corrosion of national unity. Such 
incidents make only too apparent that the distribution of 
political ideas and the control of .. the access to power have 
been great disintegrating forces in Nigeria. The way in which 
cultural associations were politicized really allows national 
consciousness to be founded on tribalism and the effect is an 
atrophied national unity. Party politics in Nigeria has pro­
duced political restlessness and a tendency to violence, and 
correspondingly undermines the role of law as a unifying force. 
In some African countries, instead of allowing a mu1ti­
national or regional po1itica1·parties, a single party has 
gained a political monopoly. The assumption seems to have been 
that a unified political party reflects a homogeneous society 
and that the nation-state can be best given a semblance of unity 
in the person of a charismatic leader, who is the chief exec­
utive and the legislator at one and the same time. In the Ivory 
Coast, the Parti Democ.ratique de cote d'Ivoire which started out 
as a protest movement in 1946 against alien rule like many other 
I 
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African parties, later assumed a political monopoly over the 
country, In order to wipe out tribalism no electoral district 
was permitted to' be congruent with a single ethnic group. With 
22 
enlarged constituencies the result is that representatives 
concentrate their appeal on occupational groups instead of 
appealing to tribal slogans. Although the supporters of the 
one party system claim that it is broad-based, there is too 
much coercion of political disfenters, especially those who 
come from a particular geographical region and represent mi­
norities in a clandestine way. Wnatever the advantages of a 
one-party system are from the standpoint of visible unity, 
there is much curtailment of civil liberties. Moreover, it 
is tantamount to the supremacy of the elite over the uneducated 
mass. Whether a one-party system will effectively produce 
national consciousness in some of the African countries which 
may adopt such a system is not easy to predict at this time. i 
The state is identified with the party and usually with a 
single charismatic leader, who, given political realities, may 
be deposed by a coup. In any case, the attempt to structure 
national consciousness on a single political party ignores 
other factors which may in time endanger national unity. 
It seems that the European powers may to some extent be 
22 
A.R. Zolberg, 'One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast' 
Princeton University Press 1964 •. Twentieth century' Africa by 
P.J.M. McEwan, (Oxford University Press 1968, London> p. 31. 
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blamed for ushering in the form of party politics which the 
Africans now ha.ve. Throughout t.he colonial period the vote 
was restricted to urbanized Africans; only on the verge of 
. I 
independence were most African men and women enfranchised. 
The Africans who since pre-colonial times had listened with 
uncritical obedience to their chiefs and elders were suddenly 
exposed to parliamentary democracy. The party slogans and 
election campaigns had tended to reawaken in Africans a kind 
of traditional war spirit that regards another party as an arch 
enemy who must be eliminated. Thus in nearly all African 
countries members of the opposition \V'ere suppressed by the 
parties in power. IntUgerla both in the regions and in the 
federal. government opposition members have faced high-handed 
treatment by the ruling parties. I~ Ghana, Dr. Nkrumah and 
the Convention Peoples Party held Dr. J. B. Danquah, a presi­
dentia1 rival, in jail under the Preventive Detention Acts. 
He died there. In Sierra Leone, on the eve of independence 
in 1961 members of the African Peoples Party were jailed to 
prevent disruption of the independence ceremony. Members of 
the opposition are frequently regarded as enemies of the 
nation state; as a result some African countries have resorted 
to a one-party system. Most of the ruling parties in many 
African countries remain constantly in power, rather than 
alternating with the party of opposition. In Ethiopia Emperor 
Haile Se1assie is the state and he does not even allow the 
formation of any party. In Liberia, 'President Tubman is a 
\ : 
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lifetime president. It is striking to remark t~at neither of 
these countries was ever ruled by any colonial power for any 
significant period of time; nonetheless, they show the trend of 
government peculiar to other African countries. In Kenya, the 
Kenya African National Union has ruled the country since 1961 
without any change of hands. From 1955 to 1966 the Nigerian 
government was dominated by the Northern Peoples' Congress. 
Ruling parties ordinarily do everything possible to perpetuate 
themselves, thus causing frustration muong the other political 
parties which desire to be in the state house. In so far as 
party politics heighten tribal rivalry and insofar as most of 
the political parties are regionally based, the tendency of 
the ruling party to entrench itself in power obstructs 
national unity. Perhaps this weakening of national conscious­
ness would not occur if the government were broad based and 
if the ruling party were not to deny governmental amenities 
to opposition areas. As a matter of· fact, most of the oppo­
sition parties would like to criticize the government and yet 
at the same time they would like to be in the government. The 
late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafewa Be1ewa put 
it in this way: 
In Nigeria, no party can agree to be in opposition 
for long. A political opposition in the Western 
accepted sense is a luxury that we cannot afford •••• 
The trouble is that the Nigerian member of Parliament 
wants to criticize the government and to be in it at 
the same time. Democracy, democracy--what is it? 
There is American democracy, British democracy--why 
not a Nigerian democracy? I wish we could find that~3 
23 
West Africa, No. 2539 (January 29, 1966) pp. 113-14. 
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Th.us 1t ca.n be seen that it 15 not really party polltics 
as such that should be held accountable for national disunity, 
but it is actually how the Africa~s understand party politics 
and apply it. It is true that party politics came indirectly 
with the European powers but for years the colonial powers 
24 
looked with jaundiced eye on the formation of political parties. 
!-iost of the African political parties developed out of protest 
movements against alien rule. In Kenya the protest movement 
24a 
nlanifested itself in the Mau Mau uprising led by the Kikuyu 
people. The result was to deprive the Kikuyu of open political
,25 
organizations as long as emergency regulations were in effect. 
In Madagascar ,the Madagascar Nationa,l Movement (HORM) was 
proscribed in 1948 because of its agitation against the ties 
between the island and France. The'Rassemblement Democratique 
Africain (RDA) of the Ivory Coast faced colonial harassment 
sj.nce the party wanted colonia1,go~ernment to respect the 
citizenship rights of Africans. In 1955 the Union of Cameroon 
Peoples advocated the reunification and independence of the 
24 
In 1940 the Kenya colonial government suppressed the 
formation of Kikuyu Central Association. In Nigeria in April 
1950 the Nigeria colonial government disbanded the ziklst 
Movement although in May it came out with a new name; the 
Freedom Movement. ' 
24a 
The Kikuyu,people revolted,against the European 
settlers because the Kikuyu land was taken away, and as such 
the Kikuyu were deprived of coffee farming. The revolt lasted 
from 1950-56. 
25 
'The emergency was declared in October 1952 and lasted 
till October 1960. 
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divided Cameroons; the party was asked to disband by the ,French 
colonial government. The two major colonial powers in Africa 
at first did not look favorably on the formation of political 
parties; and only during the interim period before independence 
were they allowed to function.as political parties per sea But 
l'in the formation the political pa~ties became regionalized and 
I
tribalistic; and all too often in ithe application of party 
politics oppression and violation of civil liberties occur. 
Consequently disillusionment and disenchantment engulf the 
elements which are not ,a part of the ruling clique. The mani­
fest frustration OIl the part of the·minor parties endangers 
national unity, and the ruling party's attempt to uproot these 
splinter parties deepens the polarization. 
Let us turn from the political history, regionalized as 
it is, to an explanation of the geographic distribution of 
population as a potential threat to Nigerian unity. During 
the 1962-63 census the population of Nigeria was 55.7 million, 
distributed as follows: Northern Nigeria, 29.8 million; 
Eastern Nigeria, 12.4 million; Western Nigeria, 10.3 million; 
Midwestern ~igeria, 2.5 million and the Federal territory of 
Lagos, 675,000. The area of Nigeria comprises 356,699 square 
miles divided as follows: Northern Nigeria 281,182 square 
miles; Eastern Nigeria, 29,484 square miles; Western Nigeria 
including the Midwest, 45,376 square miles, and the Federal 
territory of Lagos, 27 square miles. Nigeria has an average 
density of 164 persons per square mile. The North has 106 
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persons to th.e square mile; while the: vlest il1.clu6i~g the Midwest 
has 282 persons per square mile. In the East density reaches 
419 persons to the square mile, while the concentrated urban 
population of Lagos hits 25,000 persons per square mile. It 
is clear that population density is much greater in Southern 
Nigeria--Lagos, West, Midwest and East--than in the North. 
In a few areas especially in the South the population 
density of 400 to 500 per square mile has reached the 
limit of what the land can support under the presen~ 
agricultural methods and here population pressures 
have resulted in •••migration of the inhabitants. On 
the other hand, there are wide areas, as in the Northern 
Region •••which are thinly populated or virtually
uninhabited.26a 
This pressure on the land is further complicated by 
differentiating land laws. In some parts of Southern Nigeria 
customary law recognizes the right of permanent alienation; 
in the North all land is held by the government as a trust 
for the native population. NOll-Northerners are strangers 
who must obtain the right of occupancy. The possibility of 
using the North as an outlet for the heavy over-population in 
the South, and especially the East, was in a way checkmated by 
permitting the Southerners to live only in Sabon-Gari without 
full absorption into the body politic of the North. This 
containment of non-Northerners on the periphery of Northern 
towns frustrated the settlers who found themselves treated as 
infidels. These measures in practice undermined Nigerian 
citizenship. 
26aThe Ee·onomie Develbpm~nt: ·~:f:··Ni9'·~iia. Report for the 
International Bank for Reconstructiol1 and Development (The 
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1955) pp. 10-11. 
; 
66 
The concentration of population in the South to a certain 
extent may be attributed to the British administration. For 
when ,the British administrators first arrived they settled 
along the coast and developed the coastal towns such as Lagos, 
Port Harcourt and Calabar. Roads and railways radiated from 
the coastal towns inland. Thus regional inequities of popu-
lation density emanated from European coastal development. 
until the problem of inter-regional settlement is given badly 
needed legislative attention, population pressures will 
continue to feed regional animosities. 
The population census of Nigeria has been given much 
political significance, for representation in the Federal House 
of Representatives was based on geographic distribution of 
population. The Federal House of Representatives had 312 
members. Out of this number 167 seats were allocated to the 
26 
North. The East had 70 sea'ts while 57 went to the West. The 
Midwest was allocated 14 seats and the Federal capitol of 
Lagos had 4. While other areas in Nigeria practiced adult 
sufferage, the North excluded women from voting and holding 
office. The population census of 1962-63 itself produced a 
series of controversies and inter-regional conflicts. The 
Federal Government whi~h controlled the population count was 
sued by the East regional government. The ~uit failed because 
26 
In 1945 the Northern leaders had demanded representa-
tion equal to the combined seats of the East and West. 
Between 1945 and 1953 ,the House had 148 members. Between 
1954 and 1956 it had 194; and between 1957 and 1966 it had 
312. 
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the court -claimed that it had no j urisdiction O~ler census 
issues. This helped increase the loss of faith in the nation 
by some Eastern leaders. On the basis of the population census 
majority government for the whole of Nigeria was decided and 
the decision was in fa'lor of the North. Northern control of 
the Federal Government was difficult for some Southerners to 
accept because of alleged inflated figures from the North, and 
above all, because-of the lack of fairness of elections in the 
region. Although the Southern politicians accused the Northern­
ers of the 1962-3 census inaccuracies, it must be emphasized 
that all the regional governments of Nigeria manipulated the 
census figures of their regions.to gain more seats in the Fed­
eral Legislature, and all the regions controlled their elections 
in order to maintain the status quo. 
It is clear that the distribution of popu.lation in Nigeria 
has been much politicised and it is a source of conflict, more 
especially since the region with the most numerous inhabitants 
has obtained a predominating position of power despite the 
fact that the rest of the country is more highly developed in 
terms of assimilation of western ideas. In other words, the 
problem is the inability of the relatively few intellectuals 
concentrated in the South to control the government of the 
country. In some other African countries, such as Kenya, the 
political power and numerical strength of the majority tribe, 
. 
the Kikuyu, are also reflected in the composition of the 
nation's elite. The Hausa-Fulani control of the government in 
68 
-----------------~------.-------
Nigeria reflects the concept of majority rule but does not en­
tirely do away with the question of whether the un-Westernized 
mass should sacrifice its sovereign will to an intellectual 
oligarchy. From this standpoint the unity of Nigeria is hin­
dered not by the geographical distribution of population as 
such, but rather because the majority exercised political 
power without corresponding Westernization. 
To some extent Northern control of the Federal Govern­
ment because of its population strength can be blamed on 
policies of the English colonial administration. In 1945 
Sir Arthur Richards formulated the Richards constitution which 
for the first time brought the South and the North together in 
one central legislature. In the draft constitution thirty 
seats were proposed for the No':r;-th while twenty-two seats each 
were allocated for the West and the East. Although the draft 
Riehards Constitution took into account the numerical strength 
of the North, the Northerners demanded a representation equal 
to that of both the East and the West. The issue of repre­
sentation in the Central Legislature became a major disagree­
27 
ment and almost brought work of the General Conference to a 
standstill. The Governor-General bypassed the stalemated 
General Conference; he submitted the problem created by the 
Northern demands to the existing Legislative Council of Nigeria, 
27 
The members were no~inated by the governor and the 
administrators of different provinces. In addition, there were 
members of the Legislative Cou!'l.cil. 
I, 
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the me~bership of which had an official British majority. The 
Legislative Council decided in favor of the Northern demand 
and thus sold out the South to the North. The Richards Consti­
tution and the Legislative Council of Nigeria were, it appears 
on hindsight, misdirected in allocating more seats to any 
region of Nigeria. 
28 
Between 1903 and 1943 the population of Nigeria was 
counted only in the major towns; and in 1953 when the count 
was spread to the countryside the people refused to cooperate 
29 
and.returned low figures. While in. 1963 when the post-inde­
pendence population census was made there was much exaggeration 
because of the political campaign and the advantages a high 
return might have. Thus in 1945·the determination of repre­
sentation according to the population census could not 
accurately be accomplished. The allocation of a majority of 
the seats in the Central Legislature to the North allowed the 
North to develop as a strong regional bloc in opposition to 
the Southern forces. It also created a precedent that the North 
would scarcely relinquish and which the South felt forced to 
offset. 
28 
In 1929 a rumor that a census was to be taken in the 
East produced the 'Aba Riot'~ 
29 
The people associated head count with taxation and the 
greater the number of people returned in a home the more tax 
money to be collected from the head of the household. Also, 
there was a superstitious belief that people who are counted 
may die. Furthermore, there was no program to educate the 
people. 
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Regional differences in the acquisition of Western ideas 
act as a hindrance to any general cultural assimilation and 
practice of democratic principles in Nigeria. In 1926, barely 
twenty-six years after Great Britain had assumed direct admin­
istration of Nigeria, there were 138,249 pupils in the primary 
schools and 518 in the secondary schools of Southern Nigeria; 
while in the North there were only 5,210 in the primary 
schools. No secondary schools were established in the region. 
By 1947, two years after the introduction of the Richards Con­
stitution, there were 538,391 primary school pupils and 9,567 
pupils in the secondary schools of Southern Nigeria, compared 
with 70,962 pupils in the primary schools and 251 in secondary 
30 
schools in the North. The 1952 population census revealed that 
there were 834,266 literates in roman script 'in the East; 
769,933 in the West including Lagos, compared with only 250,707 
in the North. The North also had 656,259 literates in Arabic 
31 
script. In 1963, three years after Nigeria had gained its in­
dependence, Southern Nigeria registered 2,485,676 pupils in 
primary schools and 231,161 in secondary and post-primary 
institutions. The North, on the other hand, had 410,706 pupils 
30 , 
, Annual Report, Colony of Southern Nigeria, 1906, p. 199 • 
. Annual-'Report,Northern Nigeria., 1900-1911• 
. Afr~can' Education, (Oxford: Nuffield ~"oundation, 1954) 
p.47-8o 
31 	 . ," ........... . 
Population Census' of 'the We'stern'Re-gion' o'f' N'i-g'eri'a,' '1952 
(Lagos: Government .Statistician, .1953-1954).. .. ...... 
Population Census of the Norther-n' Region' 'of' Ni-g'e'ria',1952 
(Lagos: ~overnment Statistician, .19S2:::-n-S3Y •. , 
Po ulation Census of the E'astern Region' of' N'ige'ria,1953 
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ill 
71 

in primary schools and 20,312 in secondary and p6st-primary 
schools, yet the North contains about 54 percent of the popu·­
lation of the country. Only about 25 percent of the literate 
population resides in the North. This variation in the distri­
bution of educated population is an important fact to be 
considered, not simply as populatipn count that has favored 
Northern control of the Federal government. From this high 
rate of literate population in the South it can be inferred 
that there has been a change to a money economy, more accumu­
lation of western technology and a high urban-rural ratio, 
and perhaps, the rise of a new middle class. The per capita 
income in the various regions in Nigeria confirms this im­
pression: $95.20 in the West; $47 •.60 in the North, and $58.80 
in the Eastern region. These factors are likely to produce 
detribali~ation. The continuation of unweakened tribal organi­
zatJ.on in certain areas of the country in political association 
with areas of more rapid modernization clearly affects Nigerian 
unJ.ty. 
Perhaps in this context the British administration can 
be criticized. In colonial times about 98 percent of the 
schools in Nigeria were established by missionaries, and about 
97 percent of all educated persons 'in the country went through 
mission schools. But in January, 1900, when Lord Lugard became 
the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria he insisted on main­
taining all the pledges of ~he Royal Niger Company. Accordingly, 
. Christian missionaries were not allowed to proselytize in the 
North. In 1902 the High Commissioner issued the following 
I 
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report: 
am myself of the opinion that it is unwise and unjust 
to force missions upon the Mohammedan population, for 
it must be remembered i:hat without the moral support of 
the Government these missions would not be tolerated. 
And if they are established by order of the Government 
the people have some cause to disbelieve the emphatic 
pledges I have g'iven them that their religion shall in 
no way be interfered with.32 
Interestingly enough, the Colonial Office in 1917 
restated the policy that anything that threatened the Islamic 
religion in the, North endangered the authority of the emirs 
and thus undermined the system of Indirect Rule. By barring 
Christian missionaries from th~ North unless they were invited 
by the Moharr~edan emirs, the North was procluded from coming 
in contact with European culture in the form of western edu­
cation. Yet these Northerners later had to share and to 
interpret the complex and alien Richards Constitution of 1945. 
Such differences in the reception of western ideas, largely 
the effect of missionary enterprise, has contributed to 
regionalism in Nigeria. The failure of Great Britain to 
encourage religious conversions in Northern Nigeria in line 
with the rest of the country can perhaps be rega~ded as a 
hindrance to national unity caused by the European powers. 
The British colonial policy did not interfere with native 
religion unless it involved cannibalism and human sacrifice. 
The Islamic religion prevalent in Northern Nigeria did not 
affect law and order, the most essential concern of the European 
powers. In fact, t~aditional religion and culture of the North 
32Margery Perham,' N·~t·i';~···A~i~i~t,~~t'ion 'in Ni'ge-ria (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1937) p. 286. 
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were steadying influences favorable to the European presence. 
The North may seem detached from the South in the assimilation 
of western ideas but it was not exempted from the economic and 
political objectives of colonial rule. 
There are many differences in development and urbanization 
which deepen the forces of regionalism. Northern Nigeria has 
been fortunate to possess such extractive industries as the 
tin-columbite mines of Jos and the iron of Lokoja. Kano has 
been the hub of commercial activities and light industries of 
the North. In the South there are the oil wells of the Midwest 
and the East,' and there is also the coal of Enugu, although it 
is of poor quality. In the generation and distribution of 
electricity the South has such centers as Lagos, Abeokuta, 
Ibadan,Oshogbo, Benin, Sapele, Warri, Port Harcourt, Aba, 
Calabar, Onitsha, Oji River, Enugu ,and Abakaliki. On the other 
hand, the giant North has eight locations at Kaduna, Jos, Yola, 
Maiduguri, Zaria, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto. The economic 
development of the North is not comparable to its size; nor 
does it match the progress in the southern areas. Thus the 
growth of towns and urbanization which follows an economic 
development has been limited. Economic problems become nearly 
insoluble because of the conflict of interests imbedded in 
regional politics. The Federal Economic Council was supposed 
to handle such problems, but in 1963 a decision whether to 
locate an iron and steel industry either at Lokoja, an iron 
mine in the North, or at Onitsha, a populous commercial center 
in the East, could not be reached because of the political 
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publicity given the issue by the premiers of the-East and North. 
Some would gladly blame the colonial powers for the 
various differences in development characteristically found in 
most of the African countries. The European powers develope~ 
those areas of their colonies where either agricultural products 
or mineral resources could be obtained. After all, the supply 
of raw materials was one of the chief reasons for acquiring a 
colony. The European powers therefore tended to develop those 
sections which would provide maximum resources or support a 
self-sustained economy_ But African leaders since independence 
was· gained have concentrated development in those areas which 
had already been developed by the colonial powers, and they 
amplify existing disparities. In some African countries 
development becomes part of the spoils system, rewarding those 
areas which voted for a government party. For exa~ple, in 
Nigeria many of the minority areas which did not support the 
ruling regional parties were denied economic opportunities. 
Disenchantment has resulted from the failure of the ruling 
parties to live up to their pro-independence pledges of 'Life 
33 
Abundance' promised to the masses. Life Abundance failed to 
spread out to 
- . 
the lower ranks of society because of the way 
governmental favors were manipulatad by the ruling party. It 
is inevitable that political consid~ration should enter into 
decisions concerning economic development but its role should 
33 
It was the party slogan of the Action Group which ruled 
Western Nigeria. 
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be restricted. Too often some of the ruling parties employ the 
location of industry and amenities as a means of winning votes 
from the electorate. 
At this point we shall turn our attention to the problem 
of moral values in differen.tiating attitudes of Nigerians 
towards fellow members and their country as the greatest force 
working against integration. In short, in nearly all the 
African countries there has been moral erosion and the develop­
ment of differing attitudes which retard the growth of national 
unity. Of the twenty-eight black African countries which have 
gained independence about twenty-four have experienced either 
a successful coup or an abortive one. In a typical military 
takeover, the army declares it.will rid the country of tyranny, 
bribery, corruption and nepotism, yet it does not easily do so. 
Where civilian governments are in operation, some members of 
parliament try to use their influence on the government for 
their o~m personal advantage, justifying that they had spent 
a huge sum of money during electioneering. Applicants for 
government jobs often have to buy their positions from the 
ministry controlled by a politician. Many government and 
corporation employees feel that if a person wants speedy and 
efficient service such a person should make some sacrifices. 
The President, the Prime Minister and the Ministers' tribesmen 
are always favored in job opportunities; and at times a job 
vacancy may not be announced until a tribal member to fill such 
a post is found. As a result tribal rivalry is fed on the 
least powerful tribes, and the unity of all the tribal groups 
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stands in doubt. 
In Nigeria, as well as in other African countries, there 
is little or no sense of common nationality among the citizens. 
Nigerians still regard themselves as aliens in their own coun­
try and strangers among their own people. A Nigerian finds it 
hard to think of his country as a greater unit than his native 
region, and his country to him is not as important a~ his tribe. 
Normally either the tribe or the clan is the object of an 
individual's greatest loyalty. 
To some extent these problems of changing attitudes and 
. moral corrosion may be blamed on the European powers which 
colonized Africa. The traditional mores of the Africans were 
broken down by the introduction of the Western culture, 
especially by ideas of equality and a questioning of tradi­
tional deference to age. The traditional African society in 
which a person's actions and deeds were regulated by public 
approval and ancestral spirits has been devalued by European 
cultural attitudes. An African once knew that when he broke 
his society's custom he faced either a taboo or a series of 
rituals to appease the gods. But nO~7 urban centers--out­
growths of European colonialism--serve as a haven and a hideout 
for such offenders against traditional customs. An African 
who formerly felt himself to be at the mercy of his ancestral 
spirits and the earth deity, who lived in constant fear of the 
. 
supernatural often now has become a convert to European 
Christian religion which emphasizes the accountability of the 
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individual conscience to Gcd. Thus the individual priesthood 
or the individual direct communication "lith his Christian god 
disrupts the community ethics. An African nO\-l has to bear his 
moral burden arising from eith.er his actions or inaction him­
self. He is liberated from the belief that his moral actions 
would either be a shame, or a source of glory to his community. 
An African's life was once submerged in and sustained by the 
group, but nO\,l individual life increasingly overshadows 
ccmmunal life. Although many an African was intimidated by 
the fear of hell and heaven to accept the European religion, 
it is really the African's desire for the attainment of 
modernity in his life that is producing moral change. An 
lJ.fl:ican accepte.d Christianity he:ca\.1.se he either wanted to 
fr~e hilnself from a tradition~l authority or he wanted to 
ac~uire prestige and to gain material henefits. But African 
Ch;istians easily and speedily return to their fetish practi.ces 
if,they feel that misfortune has befallen them. It is true 
that the different Christian denominations have produced 
differing attitudes among the Africans since they could not 
marry and associate with non-members of the sects. But in 
pre-colonial times Africans did not marry' out.side their tribe 
I 
or clan and members of some African cults did not associate 
with non-members. Thus the va~iation in attitudes of Africans 
towards one another is partly caused by European factors and 
partly sharpened by the African conditions. A member of the 
African elite simply because he had got a financial opportunity 
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to acquire western education becomes snobbish toward non-
westernized Africans. When there is a large concentration of 
western educated men in one tribe the disintegrative effect on 
national unity is untold. Any such claim of superiority is 
likely to be resisted by other tribes who compose the nation 
state. Traditional African values limited social contacts to 
34 
people of unquestionable character 'and the unacceptable be­
havior of a given person could be transferred to his extended 

family and community. If the unacceptable code of conduct is 

generalized to t.ake in either a clan or a tribe the. unity of 

. the country is thus affected. It oeems that this African 
attitude has a ·great disruptive influence on national unity 
since Africans would cooperate with a people whom they like, 
and the building of national unity needs the cooperation of 
all sections of the nation. 
National unity has meant different thirtgs to the various 
groups that advocate it. The National Cour.lcil of Nigeria 
Citizens championed one Nigeria insofar as L:.s members would 
identify their tribal group interest with Nigerian nat.ionalism, 
and as far as most of its trading members would move unmolested 
in any part of the country. To the Action Group of Nigeria, 
unity was embodied by the creation of nu..rnerous federated states. 
And to the Northern Peoples' Congress the unity of Nigeria was 
subject to the idea of Northern hegiemOl1Y. The westernized 
I . 
34 I 
A thief, an adulterer, a trlcder who cheats, a witch 
doctor, a person who has money by grunbling, a person who reveals 
a secret and young men who fight copstantly with their parents 
or any other elderly person were no~ associated.with. 
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elders have not decided on what elements of the colonial life 
they want either to adopt or adapt. In Northern Nigeria the 
people demanded parliamentary representation but the Northern 
women were not emancipated as were their counterparts in the 
South. In Southern Nigeria 'the elite talk of majority rule 
but they opposed Northern dominance. Som~ of the Nigerian 
political leaders preached the politics of power and the 
35 
protection of their domain instead of the politics of national 
unity_ Divisiveness has constantly plagued Nigerian national 
consciousness. 
British' colonial administrative practice was responsible 
to some degree ·for the regi.onalism that plagues Nigeria. The 
first British administration was the Consulate established in 
1849 for the Bights of Benin and Biafra, with headquarters en 
the Spanish island of Fernando Po. Later, John Deecroft moved 
the headquarters to Calabar which was located within the Oil 
36 
Rivers Protectorate--an area of land east of the Niger covering 
35 
In 1963 Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the President of the coun­
try, toured the North and remarked on the plight of the 
Northerners. He was criticizeu by the Northerners for making 
such remarks. Dr. Michael Okpara, the P:r:emier of Eastern 
Nigeria, announced a tour of the West but the Wostern House of 
Chiefs passed a resolution banning Okpara from the region, but 
he went into the West. 
36 
This was an area where the livelihood of the people 
depended on the production of I,regetable cil--palm oil--and 
the oil has been the main export of the area. The trade in 
palm oil replaced the trade in slaves after its abolition in 
1833. 
I 
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the Delta &ld extending to Calabar. The Oil RivQrs Protector­
ate, established in 1885, at first had a separate consular 
administration but in 1893 the Oil Rivers area was given a new 
name, the Niger coast Protectorate, and extended to cover an 
area west of the Niger. It was also administered by a consular 
general. West of the Niger Coast Protectorate was Lagos, which 
in 1853 was created as a separate consular area in an effort to 
control the high incidence of slave trading. Within the Niger 
Coast Protectorate there was no uniform progress in ad~inis­
trative organization. The clan system worked better in Warri 
and parts of Calabar than among the Ibo of Owerri and Onitsha 
where the people were not used to being grouped within a large 
administ:t:ative unit. The Niger Coast Protectorate, which 
extended on both sides of the river Niger and was established 
particularly to look after the interest of the European 
traders, became the Southern Protectorate in 1900 under the 
rule of a governor. The Southern Protectorate with a population 
of about 8.5 million in 1921 out of the total of 18,765,000 
for the whole country, had its own separate government depart­
ments. In 1939 the Southern Protectorate was split into the 
East and the West Provinces with a population of 4.8 million 
and 3 million respectively. Each was separatety administered, 
and the separate identity of the two regions thus emerged. 
37 
The Berlin Act of 1885 declared the Niger with all its 
tributaries an international waterway and many British and 
other European traders converged in the area. 
, I 
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However, the British administrator of each 9!.'Ctlf· of provinces 
was subject to the chief administrator f:o:r: the entire country. 
Lagos, which had been declared a separate consular area 
.in 1853, bec~ne a colony in December le61. The Yoruba ruling 
chief, Docemo, ceded full sovereig:qty to the British govern­
ment. Lagos was colonized under the British lat" n,nd was 
administered directly by the Sritish officials. Y'lhile in the 
Southern provinces the natives were British protected persons, 
the residents of Lagos were regarded ClS British subjects. In 
1866 the administration of Lagos "'las directed from Sierra 
. 
Leone; then in 1874 the administration of Lagos was merged with 
the colony of the Gold Coast, nm., Ghana. Between 1881 and 
1885, the inr..abitants of Lagos protested against the loss of 
their separate administration. As a result the administra'cion 
of Lagos was separated from the Gold Coast iu 1886. In 1906, 
the Colony of Lagos, despite a very different s1stem of govern­
ment, was merged with the Southern Protectorate, the seat of 
government for which yas at Calabar. In spite of the amalgam­
ation, Lagos was ruled by a separate administrator while the 
Southern Protectorate too had its own commissioner. But the 
two administrative areas were placed under a governor, Sir 
Walter Egerton. The colony of Lagos continued its separate 
administration as a territorial area until the Constitution 
of 1951 which made it a part of the Western Region. In 1954, 
Lagos was separated from the West and declared the Federal 
Capital. The separate status of Lagos reached its climax in 
82 
May 1967 when Lagos became one of the twelve states created by 
General Gowon. 
If Lagos and the Southern Protectorate revealed differ­
ences in administration, the North presents yet another con­
trast to confirm Britishadro.inistrative regionalism in Nigeria. 
The government of the Northern Provinces from 1886 to 1899 
was the legatee of the Royal Niger Company. Hith the revocation 
of the company's charter in 1900, a British High Commissioner 
assumed the cont.roJ. of the North. Between 1900 and 1906 the 
High Commissioner, Lord Lugard, conducted a series of wars to 
. pacify the North. Even though Northern Nigeria "'as occupied 
by military conquest, the High Commissioner introduced Indirect 
Rule in the region. From 1900 to 1914 Northern Nigeria enjoyed 
its independent administration under: the commissioner's super­
vision. 
In 1914 the Colony of Lagos and the Southern Protectorate, 
and the Northern Protectorate, were amalgamated under a single 
governor-general, Lord Lugard, previously the High Commissioner 
of the North. Perhaps because of the First World War and the 
resultant shortage in staff and finance, perhaps to coordinate 
the economy of the two territories, a unification program was 
undertaken. Yet in spite of the amalgamation each protectorate 
had its own lieutenan·t governor. The amalga.rr:a tion was not very 
effective for by 1923 the medical and education departments 
were still not unified. It was only in 1933 that the police 
departments of the two areas were unified. In 1922 a Legis­
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lative Council was establish.ed. The President of the Kana 
Chamber of Co~~erce was one of its merr~ers. But strikingly 
enough, the Ilegislative Counc:i.1 only made legislation for the 
South; and legislation for the North remained in the hands of 
the lieutenant governor. In 1929, Nigeria was divided into 
four administrative units: the Colony, the Western, the 
Eastern and the Northern Provinces, each administered by a 
Commissioner. In 1945 the Richards Constitution strengthoned 
the regional grouping by giving each unit fairly broad powers. 
However, the Richards constitution brought all the regional 
members into a Central Legislature which c.lpproved all bills 
and financial legislation for the whole country. 
Although regionalism may have been in em embryonic 
stage, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 and its revision of 
1954 gave the regions greater autonomy. The British government 
based the political unity of the country on the three component 
autonomous regions. It is this three-regional structure of 
government which has proved so difficult in practice. Perhaps 
the unity of Nigeria would have been better developed if more 
states had been created. Chief Awolowo, the ex-Premier of 
Western Nigeria could not justify the arbitrary grouping of the 
federal government, instead, he advocated the grouping of 
38Nigeria into various autonomous· states on an ethnic basis. 
38 

Awo, The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. 

(Cambridge University Press, 1960) pp. 174-76. 
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For more than iif,teen years some Nigeric,ns have blamerj the 
colonial administration for the constitution \-Thich failed to 
provide more states as the Achilles' heel of national unity. 
In May 1967 General Gowon decreed the creation of twelve states 
in Nigeria, but by doing so he helped to precipitate the Civil 
War since Eastern Nigeria (Biafra) was opposed to the dismem­
bering of its region. 
British colo~ial policy and administration varied as 
governments and administrators changed hands in London. 
Except for brief interludes under Gladstone who limited 
imperialistic'designs, the period from 1885 to 1905 saw Lords 
Salispury and Rosebery as Prime Ministers, both strongadvo­
cates of imperialistic expansion. Thus private trading 
companies were chartered to acquire and rule some foreign 
territories. The Royal Niger Company and the. British Consul 
ruled various territories in Nigeria from 1885 to 1900. I·t 
was ,not easy for the interest of the trading firms to be en­
tirely eliminated when the British government took over direct 
responsibility for the various territories. Lord Lugard, an 
agent of the Royal Niger Company, a military commander of the 
company's armed forces--the R()yal West African Frontier Force-­
became the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria 1900-1906 
which had been the main domain of the company. Between 1906 
and 1914, the Liberals under Balfour and Asquith took over 
British government and reorganization of Nigeria resulted. In 
1906 Lagos was unified with the Southern Protectorate and in 
!! II II! I' 
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1914 the Northern Protectorate and the South were amalgamated. 
It seems that the amalgamation on the part of Great Britain was 
effected because the idea of free trade was dying and British 
trade was facing increased difficulties in European markets. 
Britain had to adjust its colonial conditions to make the 
situation favorable to her town-bred middle class who depended 
on trade and industries. Lord Lugard became the governor-
general of Nigerial9l2-l9l8, to implement the unification 
program. It seems that Lord Lugard's objective was to foster 
law and order, which in turn would encourage profitable trade. 
Lord Lugard did not use the system in effect in the southern 
protectorate--direct British administration in the Colony of 
Lagos, district and county councils on an English model in most 
places in the West and in the East. He admired the Northern 
system of Indirect Rule and introduced it to the South. By 
S9 doing he ignored the Westernized Africans in the South. 
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Perhaps he was disdainful of the..'U because of their demands, 
and perhaps there were not enough Westernized Africans to 
assume ruling responsibility of the whole country. In any case, 
Lord Luga.rd appealed to the traditl.onal rulers ,V'ho were in the 
majority and who could foster stability to promote trade, 
justice and peace for Britain. The future national unity of 
Nigeria was affected even at that early time because of the 
differences between the forces of change manifested in the 
39 
The inhabitants of Lagos demanded a separate adminis­
tration from Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast. 
86 

Westernized Africans in the South and the forces·of stability 
embodied in the Islamic leaders of the North. 
From 1900 to 1914 Nigeria was not administered as one 
country, largely due to the continuing effect of its piecemeal 
acquisition. Between 1914 and 1951 the country was ruled 
under a unitary form of government symbolized by the Governor­
General, one budget, one legislature and one civil service. 
But between 1951 and 1959 the strong central government was 
dropped in favor of the federal structure which the country 
still maintains. Thus Nigeria has undergone various changes 
of government since 1900 which have considerable bearing on 
present problems of unity and disunity. At the same time, 
the regionalism in Nigeria must be examined in the totality 
of the Nigerian society. In 1953 a riot broke out in Kano 
between some Northerners and Southerners simply because some 
Northern members of Parliament were booed at Lagos; and an 
opportunity for revenge occurred when a Southern politician 
announced a tour of the North. In 1965 the academic community 
of the University of Lagos witnessed a bitter quarrel among 
the university professors because an Ibo vice-chancellor, 
professor Eni Njoku, was replaced by Professor S. O. Biobaku, 
a Yoruba. Thus in all segments of Nigerian society there are 
regional and tribal attitudes which more than anything else 
weaken national unity. It is really the lack of good human 
relations or good neighborliness which paraly~ed the unity of 
the country. This is the role of oth~r African states too. 
} 
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In Kenya, Uganda, and Chad various ethnic groups are very 
sensitive towards one another. 
Some writers have blamed the European powers for having 
created European nation states in Africa, instead of buildinq 
tribal states as a more viable basis for independent existence. 
But a study of the African tribes would reveal that some of 
the tribes are not homogeneous except in name. Within the 
Fulani tribe for example there are such sub-units as the Cow 
and the Town FUlani. In the Ibo tribe there are such sub­
divisions as Nnwa, Abiriba, Oni tsha and O\-;erri peoples. The 
Yoruba tribe has sub-groups such as the Egbas and the Ijebus. 
Sometimes there may be quarrels and fighting between differing 
dialect groups of the same tribe., 
Aside from such lack of homogeneity wi.thin a tribe, a 
tribal state would not have served as the real objective of 
having a colony_ The imperialistic powers were not to all 
intents and purposes to build a political s'tate, but simply to 
organize an economic area. The larger the size of a common 
market, the better it was. If the idea of building a political 
state ever manifested itself in the British colonial plan in 
Africa, the British regarded it as a gradual approach. The 
French regarded their colonies as extensions of metropolitan 
France with the goal of assimilating the natives. The Belgians 
took their colonies as possessions that could only enjoy the 
benevolence of the Belgian king. The Spaniards, the Germans 
and the Portuguese looked upon their African colonies as 
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natural resources which were to be exploited. It must there­
fore be emphasized that it ltlaS for ccmmercl.al interest that the 
territories were first occupied, and most of the countries were 
acquired either by private traders, missionaries and chartered 
companies. The metropolitan government involvement followed 
rather later and sometimes quite reluctantly. 
To some extent the two major coloni.al powers attempted 
to wlify some of their territories economically. French West 
Africa, which comprised Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, 
Dahomey Soudan, Niger, Mallretania, and Upper Volta, was ad­
ministered as a federation after 1904. The governor-general 
who was responsible to the Minister of Colonies, had his 
headquarters in Dakar in Senegal. Until 1945 the French 
monetary system circulated throughout the Federation, but 1n 
December 1945 the Federation issued its own currency--the 
F~ench Colony of Africa franc. This was a result of the 
deterioration of the French franc during the Second World War 
and it was essential to save the economy of the colony. The 
Federation had its own central bank in Senegal which issued 
paper currency for the area. With independence of each of the 
countries, the common currency has been withdrawn. 
Great Britain, on the other hand, failed to federalize 
either its West or East African territories under a governor­
general. British West Africa, which consisted of the Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, used a common paper 
currency--the West African Currency Note. To improve production 
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of agricultural raw material2 a West African Institute for Oil 
Palm Research was established at Benin in Nigeria for all the 
colonies. After independence of each of the countries the 
former British West Africa decided to maintain the Research 
Center but at the same time they withdrew the circulation of 
the common currency. At any rate, an examination of the situ­
ation in the former colonies reveals that in spite of all the 
diversities there are certain socio-economic forces favoring 
unity. 
In Nigeria, the various regions of the country are well 
linked by means of communication. The Niger-Benue Rivers with 
their tributaries provide important water transportation routes 
to the various sections of the countrJ, though rapids and 
waterfalls on the Niger-Benue obstruct free movement on some 
reaches of these rivers. The Niger-Benue link the North to 
the South. The military headquarters of the Royal Niger 
Company was established at Lokoja, the confluence of the Niger­
Benue, while the trading center of the company was located 
southward on the Niger at Asaba. Burutu and Warri on the Niger 
Delta became headquarters of such trading firms as the United 
African Company and John Holt and Company. Baro on the Niger 
in Northern Nigeria was developed as a port to link the various 
trading areas of the South witrr the North. 
As trade proceeded inland railway lines were constructed 
to link the inland markets. The railway system radiated from 
the coastal towns. In 1896 the ~onstruction of the first rail­
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way line from Lagos to Oshogbo, a cocoa area in Yorubaland, was 
begun. This Western rail\'lay syst.em joins Minna, a gold mining 
town with Baro, a port center in the North. By 1911 this rail­
way system reached Kano, the Northern market for peanu·ts, hides 
and skins, and caravan trade. East of the Niger from the port 
town of Port Harcourt on the Niger delta, a railway line was 
laid in 1912 to reach the coal mining town of Udi. In 1927 
the Eastern line was extended to J'os, the tin-colurnbi te mining 
center in the North. After the First World War the road system 
as developed was an extension of the rail.way lines and in most 
cases the roads intersect with the railway lines. 
Apart from transporting the bulky products from one part 
of the country to another, these lines of communication have 
helped Nigerians and the administrative officials to move 
from one part of the country to thE:~ other. This movement of 
people is creating a social mix neN to Nigeria. The communi­
cation system encourages a large amount of internal trade 
within the country. Thus livestock, grains and cowpeas from 
the North and the Middle Belt, kola nuts from the West, garri 
and yams from the Middle Belt and the East circulate freely in 
all part.s of the federation. Tribal differences notwithstand­
ing all the various regions of Nigeria are complementary to 
one another in domestic marketihg. With good means of communi­
cation which each African country should list in its priorities 
the social mobility would produce a mutual understanding to 
speed up national consciousness. 
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Many ne'll towns such as Jos, Kaduna, Enugu, Baro and Port 
Harcourt were opened in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa by the 
European powers, mostly as markets or administrative centers. 
With the introduction of a money economy and the corresponding 
preference for cash income, many Africans migrated to the 
towns. This movement to urban centers has promoted detribali­
zation as well as urbanization. A sense of national identity 
is cultivated in the towns since members of many tribal groups 
mingle there. If many new towns were established, the pace of. 
detribalization would quicken a resultant: growth of national 
consciousness. Of course, the influx of people into the towns 
might also bring a high rate of unemployment and crime, but 
these incidents should be regarded as a challenge. Instead of 
concentrat.in<,3' industries and development projects in the few 
congested old towns some government projects could be used in 
opening up new towns. All sections of the community would 
then benefit from governmental projects instead of only the 
presently favored areas. 
Through the efforts of the early missionaries, the 
European powers had founded schools along the coastal and 
riverine areas. In French West Africa the Catholic mission­
aries spearheaded education until 1903 when the church and the 
state were separated in France. In Nigeria, the Catholic 
missionaries founded the first school at Lagos in 1844, while 
the Church Missionary Society founded a school at Calabar in 
the East in 1847. At first the goal of European education was 
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to enable the Africans to read and write and thus equip them 
40 
to serve as interpreters, teachers and clerks. European edu­
cation created certain common bonds among many Africans and it 
served to engender national a'Vlareness. Some educated Africans 
may quarrel over appointments such as have been made at Lagos 
univ-ersity, but education has allo\lled them to cross regional 
lines and as a result these Africans are better able to under­
stand other tribal·groups. These educated Africans have 
formed trade unions which are countrywide. For an instance, 
the .Nigerian Union of Teachers caters to the interest of all 
teachers in the country. With great advancement taking place 
in education and with proper reorganization of education 
towards national interests--instead of a tribal language, 
French and English and other tribal languages should be taught 
and African history should be developed--a new Nigerian pro­
file can be given expression. Maybe the new Nigerians will 
even be able to modify the cake of custom that at times forces 
the~ to marry within their own tribe. In an attempt to weaken 
social rigidity, marriage outside the tribe should be en­
41 
couraged, perhaps by means of preferential bride-price. The 
European powers have created directly and indirectly some bonds 
40 
Originally these types of work were done by freed 
slaves from Brazil and Sierra Leone. 
41 
Bride-price cannot be eliminated at the present rate 
of literacy in Africa. Because of the high bride-price in 
some areas some educated Africans prefer foreign wives. 
.; 
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.of union--the colonial rule, constitution making and inde­
pendence of course, the slave trade which they accentuated, 
legitimate trade and education which they activated, and the 
resulting encouragement of soci.al mobility. Political unity 
is really the responsibility of the .i\f:cicans for the European 
powers were not in Africa to build a nation-state which would 
compete with the metropolitan country, but rather wanted 
colonies to complement the mother country and serve its needs. 
! 
CHAP'l'ER IV 

CONCI"USION 

The European powers during their scramble for Africa 
removed the old political formations based on ethnic group­
ings and substituted almost everywhere nevi territorial 
groupings. The formation of territorial states satisfied the 
need of European interest groups for la.rge markets and alse 
corresponded with European conoeptions of government. 
Sectionalism and particularism existed in the new ~erritorial 
states but they did not affect European economic interests. 
The change to money economy, and above all, the European's 
military superiority, kept politIcal separateness at bay. 
But the Second World War marked a new stage in the African's 
contact with the Europeans and called in question the earlier 
European superiority. The self-determination clause contained 
in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points was echoed and 
re-echoed by a small vanguard of African elite who were not 
content to remain in a static position vis-a-vis the European. 
The wave of demands for independence caught the European 
powers relatively unprepared. Bet"..,een 1945 and 1946 France 
by its Monnet Plan, Great Britain by its Colonial Development 
Fund started more economic development for th~ir territorial 
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market areas. A political transformation took shape in Nigeria 
in 1945 when the Richards Constitution was drawn up and the 
North and the South for the first time were brought into one 
Central Legislature. France by. its constitution of 1946 
allowed elected African natives from the colonies to sit in the 
Constituent Assembly. By 1956 the loi cadre launched French 
African colonies on the way to internal autonomy within the 
French Union. To all intents and purposes it was the pressure 
of events that forced the major European powers to prepare 
their colonies for political independence. It was really too 
short a period of time for the African countries to acquire all 
the mechanics of Western democracy or even to produce a 
national consciousness. Most of ·the colonies gained independ­
ence between 1957 and 1963 when they had been ruled by foreign 
powers for over fifty years. 
It is true that the period since decolonization has also 
been too short for the African countries to achieve national 
unity, but all politico-socio-economic forces should be em­
ployed by the African leaders with the goal of increasing 
national unity. A change of attitude is needed, especially in 
light of the disparities existing in each of the countries. A 
reorganization of the political parties on a countrywide basis 
and the government being broad-based should be envisaged. In 
Nigeria there were 312 members in the Federal Legislature as 
compared to the 250 officially recognized ethnic groups. It 
would not matter if the Central Legislature were termed a 
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Tribal Assembly. Attempts should be made to contain irreden­
tists by nteans o'ther than suppression. Perhaps a government 
and a cabinet in which members of nearly all tribes are repre­
. sented could provide the tranqui11izing effect of office 
holding among the dissatisfied minorities. 
The problems of national unity in African countries are 
to a certain extent due to the existence of strong forces of 
tradition side by side with modern change. In view of the 
fact that the changes--po1itica1, economic, and socio10gica1-­
were brought about by the presence of the European powers 
there is a tendency to blame them. But insofar as the Africans 
.. 
accepted the change towards modernity they share the blame. 
1>.s long as the Africans attempt to rely on tradition to cope 
with the moderniz~t:.ion which they accepted, the problems are 
multiplied and the blame becomes diverse. It does not mean 
that the Africans should not preserve their cultural outlook 
of the African personality when it is essential to national 
progress but they cannot put a new wine i.n an old hide without 
a thorough mending. It also does not mean that the Africans 
are to be blind imitators of European ·cultura1 values, but 
they should adopt only those values that would bring the 
qreatest good to the greatest number. The European powers 
have given the Africans a new economic territorial area and 
to transform this territorial i=\rea into Cl political entity· 
should be the work of the Africans. It is true that. Nigeria 
is a plural society, a multi-state of ancient kingdoms and 
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different nationalities all lumped into one territorial sphere 
as the result of British influence. Most European nation­
states--Britain, France, Italy and Germany--were artificially 
created and they have a semblance of national unity, though 
in their case the forces of change did not occur all at the 
same time. The European powers transferred their acquired 
experience to the Africans and what was good enough for Europe 
was thought good enough for the Africans. Thus if we blame 
the European powers too much we are failing to recognize their 
sense of missd.on which allowed them to ignore changes in terms 
of time and place. The Africans must accept part of the blame 
so that they can work out better solutions to their problems. 
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